Hi Gavrilov,
On Mon, Jan 09, 2023 at 11:54:02AM +0000, Gavrilov Ilia wrote:
> When first_ip is 0, last_ip is 0xFFFFFFF, and netmask is 31, the value of
> an arithmetic expression 2 << (netmask - mask_bits - 1) is subject
> to overflow due to a failure casting operands to a larger data type
> before performing the arithmetic.
>
> Note that it's harmless since the value will be checked at the next step.
Do you mean 0xFFFFFFFF (8 rather than 8 'F's) ?
If so, I agree with this patch.
> Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center
> (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
>
> Fixes: b9fed748185a ("netfilter: ipset: Check and reject crazy /0 input parameters")
> Signed-off-by: Ilia.Gavrilov <Ilia.Gavrilov@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ip.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ip.c b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ip.c
> index a8ce04a4bb72..b8f0fb37378f 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ip.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ip.c
> @@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ bitmap_ip_create(struct net *net, struct ip_set *set, struct nlattr *tb[],
>
> pr_debug("mask_bits %u, netmask %u\n", mask_bits, netmask);
> hosts = 2 << (32 - netmask - 1);
I think that hosts also overflows, in the case you have described.
Although it also doesn't matter for the same reason you state.
But from a correctness point of view perhaps it should also be addressed?
> - elements = 2 << (netmask - mask_bits - 1);
> + elements = 2UL << (netmask - mask_bits - 1);
> }
> if (elements > IPSET_BITMAP_MAX_RANGE + 1)
> return -IPSET_ERR_BITMAP_RANGE_SIZE;
> --
> 2.30.2
>
