Re: [PATCH ghak90 V7 20/21] audit: add capcontid to set contid outside init_user_ns

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On 2019-09-18 21:22, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> Provide a mechanism similar to CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to explicitly give a
> process in a non-init user namespace the capability to set audit
> container identifiers.
> 
> Use audit netlink message types AUDIT_GET_CAPCONTID 1027 and
> AUDIT_SET_CAPCONTID 1028.  The message format includes the data
> structure:
> struct audit_capcontid_status {
>         pid_t   pid;
>         u32     enable;
> };

Paul, can I get a review of the general idea here to see if you're ok
with this way of effectively extending CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL for the sake of
setting contid from beyond the init user namespace where capable() can't
reach and ns_capable() is meaningless for these purposes?

Last weekend was Canadian Thanksgiving where I took an extra day for an
annual bike trip and I'm buried to my neck in a complete kitchen gut
(down to 1920 structural double brick and knob/tube wiring), but I've
got fixes or responses to almost everything else you've raised which
I'll post shortly.

Thanks!

> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  include/linux/audit.h      | 14 +++++++
>  include/uapi/linux/audit.h |  2 +
>  kernel/audit.c             | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  kernel/audit.h             |  5 +++
>  4 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index 1ce27af686ea..dcc53e62e266 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ struct audit_task_info {
>  	kuid_t			loginuid;
>  	unsigned int		sessionid;
>  	struct audit_cont	*cont;
> +	u32			capcontid;
>  #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
>  	struct audit_context	*ctx;
>  #endif
> @@ -224,6 +225,14 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk)
>  	return tsk->audit->sessionid;
>  }
>  
> +static inline u32 audit_get_capcontid(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> +	if (!tsk->audit)
> +		return 0;
> +	return tsk->audit->capcontid;
> +}
> +
> +extern int audit_set_capcontid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 enable);
>  extern int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *tsk, u64 contid);
>  
>  static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk)
> @@ -309,6 +318,11 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk)
>  	return AUDIT_SID_UNSET;
>  }
>  
> +static inline u32 audit_get_capcontid(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk)
>  {
>  	return AUDIT_CID_UNSET;
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index eef42c8eea77..011b0a8ee9b2 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -78,6 +78,8 @@
>  #define AUDIT_GET_LOGINUID	1024	/* Get loginuid of a task */
>  #define AUDIT_SET_LOGINUID	1025	/* Set loginuid of a task */
>  #define AUDIT_GET_SESSIONID	1026	/* Set sessionid of a task */
> +#define AUDIT_GET_CAPCONTID	1027	/* Get cap_contid of a task */
> +#define AUDIT_SET_CAPCONTID	1028	/* Set cap_contid of a task */
>  
>  #define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG	1100	/* Userspace messages mostly uninteresting to kernel */
>  #define AUDIT_USER_AVC		1107	/* We filter this differently */
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index a70c9184e5d9..7160da464849 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -1192,6 +1192,14 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
>  	case AUDIT_GET_SESSIONID:
>  		return 0;
>  		break;
> +	case AUDIT_GET_CAPCONTID:
> +	case AUDIT_SET_CAPCONTID:
> +	case AUDIT_GET_CONTID:
> +	case AUDIT_SET_CONTID:
> +		if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL) && !audit_get_capcontid(current))
> +			return -EPERM;
> +		return 0;
> +		break;
>  	default:  /* do more checks below */
>  		break;
>  	}
> @@ -1227,8 +1235,6 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
>  	case AUDIT_TTY_SET:
>  	case AUDIT_TRIM:
>  	case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV:
> -	case AUDIT_GET_CONTID:
> -	case AUDIT_SET_CONTID:
>  	case AUDIT_SET_LOGINUID:
>  		/* Only support auditd and auditctl in initial pid namespace
>  		 * for now. */
> @@ -1304,6 +1310,23 @@ static int audit_get_contid_status(struct sk_buff *skb)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static int audit_get_capcontid_status(struct sk_buff *skb)
> +{
> +	struct nlmsghdr *nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
> +	u32 seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
> +	void *data = nlmsg_data(nlh);
> +	struct audit_capcontid_status cs;
> +
> +	cs.pid = ((struct audit_capcontid_status *)data)->pid;
> +	if (!cs.pid)
> +		cs.pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
> +	rcu_read_lock();
> +	cs.enable = audit_get_capcontid(find_task_by_vpid(cs.pid));
> +	rcu_read_unlock();
> +	audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_GET_CAPCONTID, 0, 0, &cs, sizeof(cs));
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  struct audit_loginuid_status { uid_t loginuid; };
>  
>  static int audit_get_loginuid_status(struct sk_buff *skb)
> @@ -1779,6 +1802,27 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>  		if (err)
>  			return err;
>  		break;
> +	case AUDIT_SET_CAPCONTID: {
> +		struct audit_capcontid_status *s = data;
> +		struct task_struct *tsk;
> +
> +		/* check if new data is valid */
> +		if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*s))
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		tsk = find_get_task_by_vpid(s->pid);
> +		if (!tsk)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +
> +		err = audit_set_capcontid(tsk, s->enable);
> +		put_task_struct(tsk);
> +		return err;
> +		break;
> +	}
> +	case AUDIT_GET_CAPCONTID:
> +		err = audit_get_capcontid_status(skb);
> +		if (err)
> +			return err;
> +		break;
>  	case AUDIT_SET_LOGINUID: {
>  		uid_t *loginuid = data;
>  		kuid_t kloginuid;
> @@ -2711,6 +2755,56 @@ static struct task_struct *audit_cont_owner(struct task_struct *tsk)
>  	return NULL;
>  }
>  
> +int audit_set_capcontid(struct task_struct *task, u32 enable)
> +{
> +	u32 oldcapcontid;
> +	int rc = 0;
> +	struct audit_buffer *ab;
> +	uid_t uid;
> +	struct tty_struct *tty;
> +	char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
> +
> +	if (!task->audit)
> +		return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> +	oldcapcontid = audit_get_capcontid(task);
> +	/* if task is not descendant, block */
> +	if (task == current)
> +		rc = -EBADSLT;
> +	else if (!task_is_descendant(current, task))
> +		rc = -EXDEV;
> +	else if (current_user_ns() == &init_user_ns) {
> +		if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL) && !audit_get_capcontid(current))
> +			rc = -EPERM;
> +	}
> +	if (!rc)
> +		task->audit->capcontid = enable;
> +
> +	if (!audit_enabled)
> +		return rc;
> +
> +	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SET_CAPCONTID);
> +	if (!ab)
> +		return rc;
> +
> +	uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
> +	tty = audit_get_tty();
> +	audit_log_format(ab,
> +			 "opid=%d capcontid=%u old-capcontid=%u pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
> +			 task_tgid_nr(task), enable, oldcapcontid,
> +			 task_tgid_nr(current), uid,
> +			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
> +			 tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
> +			 audit_get_sessionid(current));
> +	audit_put_tty(tty);
> +	audit_log_task_context(ab);
> +	audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
> +	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
> +	audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
> +	audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !rc);
> +	audit_log_end(ab);
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * audit_set_contid - set current task's audit contid
>   * @task: target task
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> index cb25341c1a0f..ac4694e88485 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> @@ -231,6 +231,11 @@ struct audit_contid_status {
>  	u64	id;
>  };
>  
> +struct audit_capcontid_status {
> +	pid_t	pid;
> +	u32	enable;
> +};
> +
>  #define AUDIT_CONTID_DEPTH	5
>  
>  /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
> -- 
> 1.8.3.1
> 

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635



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