On 2019-05-30 19:26, Paul Moore wrote: > On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 5:29 PM Tycho Andersen <tycho@xxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 03:29:32PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > > > [REMINDER: It is an "*audit* container ID" and not a general > > > "container ID" ;) Smiley aside, I'm not kidding about that part.] > > > > This sort of seems like a distinction without a difference; presumably > > audit is going to want to differentiate between everything that people > > in userspace call a container. So you'll have to support all this > > insanity anyway, even if it's "not a container ID". > > That's not quite right. Audit doesn't care about what a container is, > or is not, it also doesn't care if the "audit container ID" actually > matches the ID used by the container engine in userspace and I think > that is a very important line to draw. Audit is simply given a value > which it calls the "audit container ID", it ensures that the value is > inherited appropriately (e.g. children inherit their parent's audit > container ID), and it uses the value in audit records to provide some > additional context for log analysis. The distinction isn't limited to > the value itself, but also to how it is used; it is an "audit > container ID" and not a "container ID" because this value is > exclusively for use by the audit subsystem. We are very intentionally > not adding a generic container ID to the kernel. If the kernel does > ever grow a general purpose container ID we will be one of the first > ones in line to make use of it, but we are not going to be the ones to > generically add containers to the kernel. Enough people already hate > audit ;) > > > > I'm not interested in supporting/merging something that isn't useful; > > > if this doesn't work for your use case then we need to figure out what > > > would work. It sounds like nested containers are much more common in > > > the lxc world, can you elaborate a bit more on this? > > > > > > As far as the possible solutions you mention above, I'm not sure I > > > like the per-userns audit container IDs, I'd much rather just emit the > > > necessary tracking information via the audit record stream and let the > > > log analysis tools figure it out. However, the bigger question is how > > > to limit (re)setting the audit container ID when you are in a non-init > > > userns. For reasons already mentioned, using capable() is a non > > > starter for everything but the initial userns, and using ns_capable() > > > is equally poor as it essentially allows any userns the ability to > > > munge it's audit container ID (obviously not good). It appears we > > > need a different method for controlling access to the audit container > > > ID. > > > > One option would be to make it a string, and have it be append only. > > That should be safe with no checks. > > > > I know there was a long thread about what type to make this thing. I > > think you could accomplish the append-only-ness with a u64 if you had > > some rule about only allowing setting lower order bits than those that > > are already set. With 4 bits for simplicity: > > > > 1100 # initial container id > > 1100 -> 1011 # not allowed > > 1100 -> 1101 # allowed, but now 1101 is set in stone since there are > > # no lower order bits left > > > > There are probably fancier ways to do it if you actually understand > > math :) > > ;) > > > Since userns nesting is limited to 32 levels (right now, IIRC), and > > you have 64 bits, this might be reasonable. You could just teach > > container engines to use the first say N bits for themselves, with a 1 > > bit for the barrier at the end. > > I like the creativity, but I worry that at some point these > limitations are going to be raised (limits have a funny way of doing > that over time) and we will be in trouble. I say "trouble" because I > want to be able to quickly do an audit container ID comparison and > we're going to pay a penalty for these larger values (we'll need this > when we add multiple auditd support and the requisite record routing). > > Thinking about this makes me also realize we probably need to think a > bit longer about audit container ID conflicts between orchestrators. > Right now we just take the value that is given to us by the > orchestrator, but if we want to allow multiple container orchestrators > to work without some form of cooperation in userspace (I think we have > to assume the orchestrators will not talk to each other) we likely > need to have some way to block reuse of an audit container ID. We > would either need to prevent the orchestrator from explicitly setting > an audit container ID to a currently in use value, or instead generate > the audit container ID in the kernel upon an event triggered by the > orchestrator (e.g. a write to a /proc file). I suspect we should > start looking at the idr code, I think we will need to make use of it. My first reaction to using the IDR code is that once an idr is given up, it can be reused. I suppose we request IDRs and then never give them up to avoid reuse... I already had some ideas of preventing an existing ID from being reused, but that makes the practice of some container engines injecting processes into existing containers difficult if not impossible. > paul moore > www.paul-moore.com - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx> Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada IRC: rgb, SunRaycer Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
