The capability check in nfnetlink_rcv() verifies that the caller
has CAP_NET_ADMIN in the namespace that "owns" the netlink socket.
However, xt_osf_fingers is shared by all net namespaces on the
system. An unprivileged user can create user and net namespaces
in which he holds CAP_NET_ADMIN to bypass the netlink_net_capable()
check:
vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os
vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os -d
These non-root operations successfully modify the systemwide OS
fingerprint list. Add new capable() checks so that they can't.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/netfilter/xt_osf.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c b/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c
index 36e14b1..a34f314 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/if.h>
#include <linux/inetdevice.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
@@ -70,6 +71,9 @@ static int xt_osf_add_callback(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
struct xt_osf_finger *kf = NULL, *sf;
int err = 0;
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER])
return -EINVAL;
@@ -115,6 +119,9 @@ static int xt_osf_remove_callback(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
struct xt_osf_finger *sf;
int err = -ENOENT;
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER])
return -EINVAL;
--
2.7.4
--
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