On Tue, Jun 27, 2017 at 05:58:25PM +0200, Pablo Neira Ayuso wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 03:50:38PM +0200, Mateusz Jurczyk wrote:
> > Verify that the length of the socket buffer is sufficient to cover the
> > nlmsghdr structure before accessing the nlh->nlmsg_len field for further
> > input sanitization. If the client only supplies 1-3 bytes of data in
> > sk_buff, then nlh->nlmsg_len remains partially uninitialized and
> > contains leftover memory from the corresponding kernel allocation.
> > Operating on such data may result in indeterminate evaluation of the
> > nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN expression.
> >
> > The bug was discovered by a runtime instrumentation designed to detect
> > use of uninitialized memory in the kernel. The patch prevents this and
> > other similar tools (e.g. KMSAN) from flagging this behavior in the future.
>
> Applied, thanks.
Wait, I keeping this back after closer look.
I think we have to remove this:
if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || <---
skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN + sizeof(struct nfgenmsg))
return;
in nfnetlink_rcv_skb_batch()
now that we make this unfront check from nfnetlink_rcv().
P.S: Sorry I couldn't look at this any sooner, I've been busy in the
last weeks preparing things for the upcoming Netfilter Workshop.
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