Julia Lawall pointed out that IPSET_ATTR_ETHER netlink attribute length
was not checked explicitly, just for the maximum possible size. Malicious
netlink clients could send shorter attribute and thus resulting a kernel
read after the buffer.
The patch adds the explicit length checkings.
Reported-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ipmac.c | 2 ++
net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_mac.c | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ipmac.c b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ipmac.c
index 29dde20..9a065f6 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ipmac.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ipmac.c
@@ -267,6 +267,8 @@ bitmap_ipmac_uadt(struct ip_set *set, struct nlattr *tb[],
e.id = ip_to_id(map, ip);
if (tb[IPSET_ATTR_ETHER]) {
+ if (nla_len(tb[IPSET_ATTR_ETHER]) != ETH_ALEN)
+ return -IPSET_ERR_PROTOCOL;
memcpy(e.ether, nla_data(tb[IPSET_ATTR_ETHER]), ETH_ALEN);
e.add_mac = 1;
}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_mac.c b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_mac.c
index f1e7d2c..8f004ed 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_mac.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_mac.c
@@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ hash_mac4_uadt(struct ip_set *set, struct nlattr *tb[],
if (tb[IPSET_ATTR_LINENO])
*lineno = nla_get_u32(tb[IPSET_ATTR_LINENO]);
- if (unlikely(!tb[IPSET_ATTR_ETHER]))
+ if (unlikely(!tb[IPSET_ATTR_ETHER] ||
+ nla_len(tb[IPSET_ATTR_ETHER]) != ETH_ALEN))
return -IPSET_ERR_PROTOCOL;
ret = ip_set_get_extensions(set, tb, &ext);
--
1.8.5.1
--
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