After improving setsockopt() coverage in trinity, I started triggering vmalloc failures pretty reliably from this code path: warn_alloc_failed+0xe9/0x140 __vmalloc_node_range+0x1be/0x270 vzalloc+0x4b/0x50 __do_replace+0x52/0x260 [ip_tables] do_ipt_set_ctl+0x15d/0x1d0 [ip_tables] nf_setsockopt+0x65/0x90 ip_setsockopt+0x61/0xa0 raw_setsockopt+0x16/0x60 sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20 SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0 It turns out we don't validate that the num_counters field in the struct we pass in from userspace is initialized. The same problem also exists in ebtables, arptables, ipv6, and the compat variants. Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c index 91180a7fc943..24c7c96bf5f8 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c @@ -1117,6 +1117,8 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, return -ENOMEM; if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct ebt_counter)) return -ENOMEM; + if (tmp.num_counters == 0) + return -EINVAL; tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name) - 1] = 0; @@ -2159,6 +2161,8 @@ static int compat_copy_ebt_replace_from_user(struct ebt_replace *repl, return -ENOMEM; if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct ebt_counter)) return -ENOMEM; + if (tmp.num_counters == 0) + return -EINVAL; memcpy(repl, &tmp, offsetof(struct ebt_replace, hook_entry)); diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c index 13bfe84bf3ca..a61200754f4b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c @@ -1075,6 +1075,9 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, /* overflow check */ if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + if (tmp.num_counters == 0) + return -EINVAL; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); @@ -1499,6 +1502,9 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, return -ENOMEM; if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + if (tmp.num_counters == 0) + return -EINVAL; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c index c69db7fa25ee..2d0e265fef6e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c @@ -1262,6 +1262,9 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len) /* overflow check */ if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + if (tmp.num_counters == 0) + return -EINVAL; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); @@ -1809,6 +1812,9 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len) return -ENOMEM; if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + if (tmp.num_counters == 0) + return -EINVAL; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index 1a732a1d3c8e..62f5b0d0bc9b 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -1275,6 +1275,9 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len) /* overflow check */ if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + if (tmp.num_counters == 0) + return -EINVAL; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); @@ -1822,6 +1825,9 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len) return -ENOMEM; if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + if (tmp.num_counters == 0) + return -EINVAL; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netfilter-devel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
