On 9/27/2010 12:25 PM, Eric Paris wrote: > On Mon, 2010-09-27 at 14:29 -0400, Paul Moore wrote: >> On Mon, 2010-09-27 at 13:01 -0400, Eric Paris wrote: >>> On Mon, 2010-09-27 at 10:50 +1000, James Morris wrote: >>>> On Fri, 24 Sep 2010, Eric Paris wrote: >>>> For the reasons above, I think the secctx string needs to be exported in >>>> addition to this rather than instead of. >>> I won't argue, I don't agree with your reasoning, but I'm not opposed to >>> this result. We have 3 competing suggestions: >>> >>> Jan suggested we: >>> completely eliminate secmark from procfs+netlink and only export secctx >>> in netlink. >>> >>> Eric suggested we: >>> completely eliminate secmark from procfs+netlink and then export secctx >>> in procfs+netlink >>> >>> sounds like James suggested we: >>> continue to export meaningless and confusing secmark from procfs+netlink >>> and then export secctx in procfs+netlink as well. >>> >>> I'm going to implement James' idea and resend the patch series. Any >>> strong objections? >> I apologize for not getting a chance to look at these patches sooner. >> In general they look fine to me and my only real concern was addressed >> by Pablo already (breaking userspace due to #define changes). >> >> As far as exporting the 32bit secid/secmark to userspace, I think that >> is a mistake. James correctly points out that it does map to a LSM >> specific value, e.g. SELinux and Smack security labels, but I don't >> think he makes it clear that in the two LSMs that currently use secids >> the mapping between the secid and the secctx is not constant; the secids >> are transient values that will change with each boot in a manner that >> userspace can not predict. For this reason, I think exporting the >> secids is only going to cause users/admins grief, whereas exporting the >> associated secctx should be a much more stable value and is likely what >> the user/admin is expecting anyway. > So it sounds to me like Paul agrees with me that exporting the SELinux > sid as 'secmark=' was a bad idea. It's the whole reason this thread > started, someone wanted to be able to translate and use that field (and > instantly realized it was useless.) > > I see it as having 3 options. lets assume was have a packet with > selinux sid=121 and selinux context=packet_t. We can > > 1) secmark=121 secctx=packet_t > This continues to send secmark like we do and people might continue to > be baffled by the 121. > > 2) secmark=1 secctx=packet_t > This sends a secmark field to userspace so if an application which > reads this exists (I doubt such an application actually exists in in the > real world) it will still get all of the information it got before but > noone will be baffled by what the number means. 1/0 is pretty obvious. > > 3) secctx=packet_t > Smallest easiest, what my patches actually do. Could theoretically > break some script that expected the field to be there, but any such > script is already broken since that field can be easily compiled > out...... > > James, if you are adamant about #1 I'll resend, otherwise I'm sticking > with #3..... The Smack Project leadership recommends #3. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netfilter-devel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
