On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 9:34 AM, wzt wzt <wzt.wzt@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> I can see that the size might cause an overflow in the addition with
>> sizeof(struct ipt_get_entries)
> That's the integer overflow i pointed.
> get.size is copy from the user space, it can be set as 0x7fffffff,
> addition with sizeof(struct ipt_get_entries) can be overflow.
Patrick's point is that you're using "if (get.size >= INT_MAX /
sizeof(struct ipt_get_entries))"
So, did you find any chance that get.size * sizeof(struct
ipt_get_entries) >= INT_MAX ?
And, for the addition overflow, can it be caught by
"if (*len != sizeof(struct ipt_get_entries) + get.size)" ???
>
> if (*len != sizeof(struct ipt_get_entries) + get.size) {
> duprintf("get_entries: %u != %zu\n",
> *len, sizeof(get) + get.size);
> return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> so, check get.size max value before addition with sizeof(struct
> ipt_get_entries) to prevent the integer overflow.
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
>
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netfilter-devel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
