Dear, Netfilter developers! Recently, I wondered how conntrack's helpers work. А questionable point exists in the conntrack expectations design. What happens if somebody opened fake outgoing connection which would match conntrack helpers' signatures? Conntrack module will be able to add records in expectation table. And somebody would connect to this port from outside and come through iptables rules. If you think that this is just a joke, I intend to show that it is a really serious problem and I founded two ways to exploit it. In the first case, we have a single Linux host connected directly to the public network. Usually, iptables config for the workstation are similar to this: ------ iptables -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT iptables -A INPUT -p icmp -j ACCEPT iptables -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT # accept established connections iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT # allow access to http server iptables -P INPUT DROP # drop other incoming connections iptables -P OUTPUT -j ACCEPT # allow any connection from the host ------ Also nf_conntrack_ftp module loaded in order to enable active ftp work. You can argue that this configuration so stupid, and I must specify --dport in -m state rule. I understand, but anyway, I found plenty of manuals on the Internet which look like above described, e.g. https://help.ubuntu.com/community/IptablesHowTo If malicious software could initiate connection to remote 21 port and send tcp packets like this ------ > USER anonymous > PASS test@xxxxxxxxxxx > PORT x,x,x,x,y,z ------ where x,x,x,x is host ip on external network, then (y << 8 | z) port will be OPENED from the sender ip address. For example, we can use y=0, z=22 to open a ssh port, or, y=21, z=56 to open a database server. In the second case, we have host in local network masquared by Linux NAT. Regular iptables config for NAT looks like this: ------ iptables -A FORWARD -s 192.168.0.0/24 -o eth1 -j ACCEPT iptables -A FORWARD -d 192.168.0.0/24 -i eth1 -j ACCEPT iptables -P FORWARD DROP iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s 192.168.0.0/24 -o eth1 -j SNAT --to-source x.x.x.x sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding=1 ------ where 192.168.0.0/24 internal network and x.x.x.x external ip address. Unfortunately, all users from 192.168.0.0/24 will have problems with an active FTP. Users will force administrators to read boring manuals as alredy founded and load nf_connrack_ftp + nf_nat_ftp to "overcome" the problem. Next, if malicious software would initiate connection as in the previous case, NAT subsystem will forward (y << 8 | z) port to outside by changing source PORT command and, in fact, forwarding a port inside. So, if we something would open connections to remote 21 port and send our PORT commands, we can transparently open ANY port from INTERNAL server to the public Internet, regardless NAT. Hereinafter, I'll call this "conntrack back-connection issue". Furthermore, various ways to inititate connections from client exists. It can be malicious software, that needs only user permisions to open connection outgoing connection, or user himself, or ... surprise, just a web-browser. Contemporary HTML standards support for outgoing socket connections in web applications. Moreover, now you can use Adobe Flash, Java Applets, XMLHTTPRequest and so on to start an outgoing connection and to send appropriate signatures through conntrack helpers. I have made simple exploit of this issue. This is just a simple HTML page on client and fake FTP server on the side of attacker. Currently, no browsers in production supported WebSockets and I decided to use flash-based jSocket library to initiate back-connections. A small protection exists in nf_conntrack_ftp code. It checks if ip address in PORT command exactly same as a sender ip address. So, we can't get internal client ip address in a browser, it's absolutely impossible. If you knew how to do it, please tell me. So my code blindly probes all fake ip addresses. It transmits about 3-4 megabytes for /16 network (its just nothing for contemporary speeds). I have published all at a my git repo (http://gitorious.org/art1x/conntrack-issue). I tested this code with various versions of kernel, incl. 2.4.x and current 2.6.x. A lot of network devices loads nf_conntrack_* modules by default, because users have problems with old protocols such as active ftp. I think, usually administrators of various corporate' routers also enables it. All that I have described above are not bug, it just ftp protocol design drawbacks. FTP is a application level protocol (in terms of OSI model) that sends information about level 3 connection (ip address in PORT command). BTW, a file transfer protocol was invented in the 70s before any established network models. There are a lot of application level protocols which also have some problems and can't be transparently transfered over the NAT without additional efforts, e.g. sip, p2p, etc. But anyway, only nf_conntrack_ftp adds tcp exceptions to Netfilter, and udp proto isn't really interested. Code of nf_conntrack_ftp.c is perfect and I've no idea what we can additionaly check here. Somebody also uses other helpers, not only the nf_conntrack_ftp. This modules is really needed for normal work, but its unsecury at the sometime. May be, we should add a large warning message to it? I've blacklisted application layer helpers at my router, but I haven't found real solution of the problem yet. -- WBR, Tsisyk Roman -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netfilter-devel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
