Re: security impact of creating rulesets with iptables (cmd)

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On Monday 2009-08-10 08:58, Patrick McHardy wrote:
>> 
>> The second and more interesting point is that this would also introduce
>> a timeframe where packets could slip through while these exchanges
>> between kernel and userspace are happening. Why does setting the policy
>> to DROP not solve this problem?
>
>This is not correct, the replacement is atomic.

(Elaborating on this.) The _replacement_ itself is indeed atomic,
the issue arises when a table is in place that allows something
that is later restricted again by a new table update.

1. iptables -A INPUT -p esp -j ACCEPT
2. echo 'Possibly open from here on...'
3. iptables -P FORWARD DROP
4. echo 'Now closed again'

Now if you have a large ruleset, and RT preemption, or lots of CPUs,
or an overly busy system, etc., it may take "longer than usual" until
step 3 is in effect.
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