The patch titled Subject: /proc/pid/status: add "Seccomp" field has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was proc-pid-status-add-seccomp-field.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree ------------------------------------------------------ From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Subject: /proc/pid/status: add "Seccomp" field It is currently impossible to examine the state of seccomp for a given process. While attaching with gdb and attempting "call prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP,...)" will work with some situations, it is not reliable. If the process is in seccomp mode 1, this query will kill the process (prctl not allowed), if the process is in mode 2 with prctl not allowed, it will similarly be killed, and in weird cases, if prctl is filtered to return errno 0, it can look like seccomp is disabled. When reviewing the state of running processes, there should be a way to externally examine the seccomp mode. ("Did this build of Chrome end up using seccomp?" "Did my distro ship ssh with seccomp enabled?") This adds the "Seccomp" line to /proc/$pid/status. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt | 2 ++ fs/proc/array.c | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+) diff -puN Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt~proc-pid-status-add-seccomp-field Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt --- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt~proc-pid-status-add-seccomp-field +++ a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt @@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ read the file /proc/PID/status: CapPrm: 0000000000000000 CapEff: 0000000000000000 CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff + Seccomp: 0 voluntary_ctxt_switches: 0 nonvoluntary_ctxt_switches: 1 @@ -237,6 +238,7 @@ Table 1-2: Contents of the status files CapPrm bitmap of permitted capabilities CapEff bitmap of effective capabilities CapBnd bitmap of capabilities bounding set + Seccomp seccomp mode, like prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, ...) Cpus_allowed mask of CPUs on which this process may run Cpus_allowed_list Same as previous, but in "list format" Mems_allowed mask of memory nodes allowed to this process diff -puN fs/proc/array.c~proc-pid-status-add-seccomp-field fs/proc/array.c --- a/fs/proc/array.c~proc-pid-status-add-seccomp-field +++ a/fs/proc/array.c @@ -336,6 +336,13 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_f render_cap_t(m, "CapBnd:\t", &cap_bset); } +static inline void task_seccomp(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP + seq_printf(m, "Seccomp:\t%d\n", p->seccomp.mode); +#endif +} + static inline void task_context_switch_counts(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) { @@ -369,6 +376,7 @@ int proc_pid_status(struct seq_file *m, } task_sig(m, task); task_cap(m, task); + task_seccomp(m, task); task_cpus_allowed(m, task); cpuset_task_status_allowed(m, task); task_context_switch_counts(m, task); _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx are origin.patch linux-next.patch audit-create-explicit-audit_seccomp-event-type.patch audit-catch-possible-null-audit-buffers.patch binfmt_elfc-use-get_random_int-to-fix-entropy-depleting.patch exec-do-not-leave-bprm-interp-on-stack.patch -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe mm-commits" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html