The patch titled
Subject: proc: use task_access_lock() instead of ptrace_may_access()
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
proc-use-task_access_lock-instead-of-ptrace_may_access.patch
This patch was dropped because it was withdrawn
The current -mm tree may be found at http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/
------------------------------------------------------
From: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@xxxxxxxxx>
Subject: proc: use task_access_lock() instead of ptrace_may_access()
There are several places in fs/proc/base.c still use ptrace_may_access()
directly to check the permission, actually this just gets a snapshot of
the permission, nothing prevents the target task from raising the
priviledges itself, it is better to use task_access_lock() for these
places, to hold the priviledges.
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
diff -puN fs/proc/base.c~proc-use-task_access_lock-instead-of-ptrace_may_access fs/proc/base.c
--- a/fs/proc/base.c~proc-use-task_access_lock-instead-of-ptrace_may_access
+++ a/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -253,6 +253,23 @@ static int proc_pid_auxv(struct task_str
return res;
}
+static int task_access_lock(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
+
+{
+ int err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (!ptrace_may_access(task, mode)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void task_access_unlock(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+}
#ifdef CONFIG_KALLSYMS
/*
@@ -264,35 +281,18 @@ static int proc_pid_wchan(struct task_st
unsigned long wchan;
char symname[KSYM_NAME_LEN];
+ if (task_access_lock(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+ return 0;
wchan = get_wchan(task);
+ task_access_unlock(task);
if (lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname) < 0)
- if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
- return 0;
- else
- return sprintf(buffer, "%lu", wchan);
+ return sprintf(buffer, "%lu", wchan);
else
return sprintf(buffer, "%s", symname);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KALLSYMS */
-static int task_access_lock(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
-{
- int err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
- if (err)
- return err;
- if (!ptrace_may_access(task, mode)) {
- mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
- return -EPERM;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void task_access_unlock(struct task_struct *task)
-{
- mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
-}
-
#ifdef CONFIG_STACKTRACE
#define MAX_STACK_TRACE_DEPTH 64
@@ -512,23 +512,6 @@ static int proc_pid_syscall(struct task_
/* Here the fs part begins */
/************************************************************************/
-/* permission checks */
-static int proc_fd_access_allowed(struct inode *inode)
-{
- struct task_struct *task;
- int allowed = 0;
- /* Allow access to a task's file descriptors if it is us or we
- * may use ptrace attach to the process and find out that
- * information.
- */
- task = get_proc_task(inode);
- if (task) {
- allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
- put_task_struct(task);
- }
- return allowed;
-}
-
int proc_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
{
int error;
@@ -1425,17 +1408,21 @@ static int proc_exe_link(struct dentry *
static void *proc_pid_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
int error = -EACCES;
/* We don't need a base pointer in the /proc filesystem */
path_put(&nd->path);
/* Are we allowed to snoop on the tasks file descriptors? */
- if (!proc_fd_access_allowed(inode))
+ error = task_access_lock(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+ if (error)
goto out;
error = PROC_I(inode)->op.proc_get_link(dentry, &nd->path);
+ task_access_unlock(task);
out:
+ put_task_struct(task);
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
@@ -1467,19 +1454,24 @@ static int proc_pid_readlink(struct dent
{
int error = -EACCES;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
struct path path;
/* Are we allowed to snoop on the tasks file descriptors? */
- if (!proc_fd_access_allowed(inode))
+ error = task_access_lock(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+ if (error)
goto out;
error = PROC_I(inode)->op.proc_get_link(dentry, &path);
if (error)
- goto out;
+ goto out_unlock;
error = do_proc_readlink(&path, buffer, buflen);
path_put(&path);
+out_unlock:
+ task_access_unlock(task);
out:
+ put_task_struct(task);
return error;
}
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from xiyou.wangcong@xxxxxxxxx are
linux-next.patch
cris-select-generic_atomic64.patch
proc-clean-up-proc-pid-environ-handling.patch
proc-clean-up-proc-pid-environ-handling-checkpatch-fixes.patch
proc-unify-ptrace_may_access-locking-code.patch
proc-remove-mm_for_maps.patch
proc-use-mm_access-instead-of-ptrace_may_access.patch
proc-use-is_err_or_null.patch
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