The patch titled
xtensa: prevent arbitrary read in ptrace
has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is
xtensa-prevent-arbitrary-read-in-ptrace.patch
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See http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/stuff/added-to-mm.txt to find
out what to do about this
The current -mm tree may be found at http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/
------------------------------------------------------
Subject: xtensa: prevent arbitrary read in ptrace
From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Prevent an arbitrary kernel read. Check the user pointer with access_ok()
before copying data in.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Christian Zankel <chris@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff -puN arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c~xtensa-prevent-arbitrary-read-in-ptrace arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c
--- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c~xtensa-prevent-arbitrary-read-in-ptrace
+++ a/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -147,6 +147,9 @@ int ptrace_setxregs(struct task_struct *
elf_xtregs_t *xtregs = uregs;
int ret = 0;
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, uregs, sizeof(elf_xtregs_t)))
+ return -EIO;
+
#if XTENSA_HAVE_COPROCESSORS
/* Flush all coprocessors before we overwrite them. */
coprocessor_flush_all(ti);
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from drosenberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxx are
xtensa-prevent-arbitrary-read-in-ptrace.patch
xtensa-prevent-arbitrary-read-in-ptrace-fix.patch
linux-next.patch
drivers-scsi-pmcraid-reject-negative-request-size.patch
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