The patch titled
userns: make has_capability* into real functions
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
userns-make-has_capability-into-real-functions.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
The current -mm tree may be found at http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/
------------------------------------------------------
Subject: userns: make has_capability* into real functions
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
So we can let type safety keep things sane, and as a bonus we can remove
the declaration of init_user_ns in capability.h.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@xxxxxxx>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 34 ++--------------------
kernel/capability.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff -puN include/linux/capability.h~userns-make-has_capability-into-real-functions include/linux/capability.h
--- a/include/linux/capability.h~userns-make-has_capability-into-real-functions
+++ a/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -371,8 +371,6 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
struct dentry;
struct user_namespace;
-extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;
-
struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void);
extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
@@ -541,34 +539,10 @@ static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfs
cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
}
-/**
- * has_capability - Determine if a task has a superior capability available
- * @t: The task in question
- * @cap: The capability to be tested for
- *
- * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect, false if not.
- *
- * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
- */
-#define has_capability(t, cap) (security_real_capable((t), &init_user_ns, (cap)) == 0)
-
-#define has_ns_capability(t, ns, cap) (security_real_capable((t), (ns), (cap)) == 0)
-
-/**
- * has_capability_noaudit - Determine if a task has a superior capability available (unaudited)
- * @t: The task in question
- * @cap: The capability to be tested for
- *
- * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect, false if not, but don't write an audit message for the
- * check.
- *
- * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
- */
-#define has_capability_noaudit(t, cap) \
- (security_real_capable_noaudit((t), &init_user_ns, (cap)) == 0)
-
+extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
+extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
extern bool capable(int cap);
extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
diff -puN kernel/capability.c~userns-make-has_capability-into-real-functions kernel/capability.c
--- a/kernel/capability.c~userns-make-has_capability-into-real-functions
+++ a/kernel/capability.c
@@ -291,6 +291,60 @@ error:
}
/**
+ * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns
+ * @t: The task in question
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
+ * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not.
+ *
+ * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
+ */
+bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+{
+ int ret = security_real_capable(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
+
+ return (ret == 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns
+ * @t: The task in question
+ * @ns: target user namespace
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
+ * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
+ *
+ * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
+ */
+bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+{
+ int ret = security_real_capable(t, ns, cap);
+
+ return (ret == 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited)
+ * @t: The task in question
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
+ * currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not. Don't write an
+ * audit message for the check.
+ *
+ * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
+ */
+bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+{
+ int ret = security_real_capable_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
+
+ return (ret == 0);
+}
+
+/**
* capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
* @cap: The capability to be tested for
*
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxxxxx are
origin.patch
ipcns-fix-use-after-free-in-free_ipc_ns.patch
cgroup-remove-the-ns_cgroup.patch
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe mm-commits" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
