The patch titled proc: document why writing to /proc/pid/mem is a security hazard has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is proc-document-why-writing-to-proc-pid-mem-is-a-security-hazard.patch Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code *** See http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/stuff/added-to-mm.txt to find out what to do about this The current -mm tree may be found at http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/ ------------------------------------------------------ Subject: proc: document why writing to /proc/pid/mem is a security hazard From: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@xxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@xxxxxxxx> Cc: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- fs/proc/base.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff -puN fs/proc/base.c~proc-document-why-writing-to-proc-pid-mem-is-a-security-hazard fs/proc/base.c --- a/fs/proc/base.c~proc-document-why-writing-to-proc-pid-mem-is-a-security-hazard +++ a/fs/proc/base.c @@ -832,7 +832,11 @@ out_no_task: #define mem_write NULL #ifndef mem_write -/* This is a security hazard */ +/* + * As implemented, mem_write would be a security hazard if enabled. For + * example, the target task could exec a setuid-root binary between the + * permission check and the write into memory. + */ static ssize_t mem_write(struct file * file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from wilsons@xxxxxxxx are proc-document-why-writing-to-proc-pid-mem-is-a-security-hazard.patch -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe mm-commits" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html