The patch titled
kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers from unprivileged users
has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is
kptr_restrict-for-hiding-kernel-pointers-from-unprivileged-users.patch
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------------------------------------------------------
Subject: kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers from unprivileged users
From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Add the %pK printk format specifier, the CONFIG_SECURITY_KPTR_RESTRICT
configuration option, and the kptr_restrict sysctl.
The %pK format specifier is designed to hide exposed kernel pointers from
unprivileged users, specifically via /proc interfaces. Its behavior
depends on the kptr_restrict sysctl, whose default value depends on
CONFIG_SECURITY_KPTR_RESTRICT.
If kptr_restrict is set to 0, no deviation from the standard %p behavior
occurs. If kptr_restrict is set to 1, if the current user (intended to be
a reader via seq_printf(), etc.) does not have CAP_SYSLOG (which is
currently in the LSM tree), kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's.
This was chosen over the default "(null)", which cannot be parsed by
userland %p, which expects "(nil)".
v2 improves checking for inappropriate context, on suggestion by Peter
Zijlstra. Thanks to Thomas Graf for suggesting use of a centralized
format specifier.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxx>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 14 ++++++++++++++
include/linux/kernel.h | 2 ++
kernel/sysctl.c | 9 +++++++++
lib/vsprintf.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
security/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++
5 files changed, 55 insertions(+)
diff -puN Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt~kptr_restrict-for-hiding-kernel-pointers-from-unprivileged-users Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt~kptr_restrict-for-hiding-kernel-pointers-from-unprivileged-users
+++ a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
- hotplug
- java-appletviewer [ binfmt_java, obsolete ]
- java-interpreter [ binfmt_java, obsolete ]
+- kptr_restrict
- kstack_depth_to_print [ X86 only ]
- l2cr [ PPC only ]
- modprobe ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
@@ -261,6 +262,19 @@ This flag controls the L2 cache of G3 pr
==============================================================
+kptr_restrict:
+
+This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented from reading
+kernel addresses via /proc and other interfaces. When kptr_restrict is set
+to (0), there are no restrictions. When kptr_restrict is set to (1), kernel
+pointers printed using the %pK format specifier will be replaced with 0's
+unless the user has CAP_SYSLOG.
+
+The kernel config option CONFIG_SECURITY_KPTR_RESTRICT sets the default
+value of kptr_restrict.
+
+==============================================================
+
kstack_depth_to_print: (X86 only)
Controls the number of words to print when dumping the raw
diff -puN include/linux/kernel.h~kptr_restrict-for-hiding-kernel-pointers-from-unprivileged-users include/linux/kernel.h
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h~kptr_restrict-for-hiding-kernel-pointers-from-unprivileged-users
+++ a/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -216,6 +216,8 @@ extern int sscanf(const char *, const ch
extern int vsscanf(const char *, const char *, va_list)
__attribute__ ((format (scanf, 2, 0)));
+extern int kptr_restrict; /* for sysctl */
+
extern int get_option(char **str, int *pint);
extern char *get_options(const char *str, int nints, int *ints);
extern unsigned long long memparse(const char *ptr, char **retptr);
diff -puN kernel/sysctl.c~kptr_restrict-for-hiding-kernel-pointers-from-unprivileged-users kernel/sysctl.c
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c~kptr_restrict-for-hiding-kernel-pointers-from-unprivileged-users
+++ a/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -712,6 +712,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
},
#endif
{
+ .procname = "kptr_restrict",
+ .data = &kptr_restrict,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = &zero,
+ .extra2 = &one,
+ },
+ {
.procname = "ngroups_max",
.data = &ngroups_max,
.maxlen = sizeof (int),
diff -puN lib/vsprintf.c~kptr_restrict-for-hiding-kernel-pointers-from-unprivileged-users lib/vsprintf.c
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c~kptr_restrict-for-hiding-kernel-pointers-from-unprivileged-users
+++ a/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -936,6 +936,8 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end,
return string(buf, end, uuid, spec);
}
+int kptr_restrict = CONFIG_SECURITY_KPTR_RESTRICT;
+
/*
* Show a '%p' thing. A kernel extension is that the '%p' is followed
* by an extra set of alphanumeric characters that are extended format
@@ -979,6 +981,7 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end,
* Implements a "recursive vsnprintf".
* Do not use this feature without some mechanism to verify the
* correctness of the format string and va_list arguments.
+ * - 'K' For a kernel pointer that should be hidden from unprivileged users
*
* Note: The difference between 'S' and 'F' is that on ia64 and ppc64
* function pointers are really function descriptors, which contain a
@@ -1035,6 +1038,21 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf
return buf + vsnprintf(buf, end - buf,
((struct va_format *)ptr)->fmt,
*(((struct va_format *)ptr)->va));
+ case 'K':
+ if (kptr_restrict) {
+ if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi())
+ WARN(1, "%%pK used in interrupt context.\n");
+
+ else if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
+ break;
+
+ if (spec.field_width == -1) {
+ spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(void *);
+ spec.flags |= ZEROPAD;
+ }
+ return number(buf, end, 0, spec);
+ }
+ break;
}
spec.flags |= SMALL;
if (spec.field_width == -1) {
diff -puN security/Kconfig~kptr_restrict-for-hiding-kernel-pointers-from-unprivileged-users security/Kconfig
--- a/security/Kconfig~kptr_restrict-for-hiding-kernel-pointers-from-unprivileged-users
+++ a/security/Kconfig
@@ -82,6 +82,18 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+config SECURITY_KPTR_RESTRICT
+ bool "Hide kernel pointers from unprivileged users"
+ default n
+ help
+ This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading kernel
+ addresses via various interfaces, e.g. /proc.
+
+ If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
+ unless the kptr_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
config SECURITY
bool "Enable different security models"
depends on SYSFS
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from drosenberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxx are
linux-next.patch
kptr_restrict-for-hiding-kernel-pointers-from-unprivileged-users.patch
kptr_restrict-for-hiding-kernel-pointers-from-unprivileged-users-fix.patch
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