The patch titled mm: install_special_mapping skips security_file_mmap() check has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is mm-install_special_mapping-skips-security_file_mmap-check.patch Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code *** See http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/stuff/added-to-mm.txt to find out what to do about this The current -mm tree may be found at http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/ ------------------------------------------------------ Subject: mm: install_special_mapping skips security_file_mmap() check From: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> The install_special_mapping routine (used, for example, to setup the vdso) skips the security check before insert_vm_struct, allowing a local attacker to bypass the mmap_min_addr security restriction by limiting the available pages for special mappings. bprm_mm_init() also skips the check, although I don't think this can be used to bypass any restrictions, I don't see any reason not to have the security check. $ uname -m x86_64 $ cat /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr 65536 $ cat install_special_mapping.s section .bss resb BSS_SIZE section .text global _start _start: mov eax, __NR_pause int 0x80 $ nasm -D__NR_pause=29 -DBSS_SIZE=0xfffed000 -f elf -o install_special_mapping.o install_special_mapping.s $ ld -m elf_i386 -Ttext=0x10000 -Tbss=0x11000 -o install_special_mapping install_special_mapping.o $ ./install_special_mapping & [1] 14303 $ cat /proc/14303/maps 0000f000-00010000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 00010000-00011000 r-xp 00001000 00:19 2453665 /home/taviso/install_special_mapping 00011000-ffffe000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] It's worth noting that Red Hat are shipping with mmap_min_addr set to 4096. Signed-off-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Robert Swiecki <swiecki@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Greg KH <greg@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Eugene Teo <eugene@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- fs/exec.c | 7 +++++++ mm/mmap.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+) diff -puN fs/exec.c~mm-install_special_mapping-skips-security_file_mmap-check fs/exec.c --- a/fs/exec.c~mm-install_special_mapping-skips-security_file_mmap-check +++ a/fs/exec.c @@ -275,7 +275,14 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_b vma->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS | VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP; vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vma->anon_vma_chain); + + err = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1); + + if (err) + goto err; + err = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma); + if (err) goto err; diff -puN mm/mmap.c~mm-install_special_mapping-skips-security_file_mmap-check mm/mmap.c --- a/mm/mmap.c~mm-install_special_mapping-skips-security_file_mmap-check +++ a/mm/mmap.c @@ -2479,6 +2479,11 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_st vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops; vma->vm_private_data = pages; + if (security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1)) { + kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); + return -EPERM; + } + if (unlikely(insert_vm_struct(mm, vma))) { kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); return -ENOMEM; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from taviso@xxxxxxxxxxxxx are mm-install_special_mapping-skips-security_file_mmap-check.patch mm-install_special_mapping-skips-security_file_mmap-check-fix.patch -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe mm-commits" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html