The patch titled do_exit(): make sure that we run with get_fs() == USER_DS has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was do_exit-make-sure-we-run-with-get_fs-==-user_ds.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree The current -mm tree may be found at http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/ ------------------------------------------------------ Subject: do_exit(): make sure that we run with get_fs() == USER_DS From: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@xxxxxxxxxxx> If a user manages to trigger an oops with fs set to KERNEL_DS, fs is not otherwise reset before do_exit(). do_exit may later (via mm_release in fork.c) do a put_user to a user-controlled address, potentially allowing a user to leverage an oops into a controlled write into kernel memory. This is only triggerable in the presence of another bug, but this potentially turns a lot of DoS bugs into privilege escalations, so it's worth fixing. I have proof-of-concept code which uses this bug along with CVE-2010-3849 to write a zero to an arbitrary kernel address, so I've tested that this is not theoretical. A more logical place to put this fix might be when we know an oops has occurred, before we call do_exit(), but that would involve changing every architecture, in multiple places. Let's just stick it in do_exit instead. [akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx: update code comment] Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@xxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- kernel/exit.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff -puN kernel/exit.c~do_exit-make-sure-we-run-with-get_fs-==-user_ds kernel/exit.c --- a/kernel/exit.c~do_exit-make-sure-we-run-with-get_fs-==-user_ds +++ a/kernel/exit.c @@ -914,6 +914,15 @@ NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code) if (unlikely(!tsk->pid)) panic("Attempted to kill the idle task!"); + /* + * If do_exit is called because this processes oopsed, it's possible + * that get_fs() was left as KERNEL_DS, so reset it to USER_DS before + * continuing. Amongst other possible reasons, this is to prevent + * mm_release()->clear_child_tid() from writing to a user-controlled + * kernel address. + */ + set_fs(USER_DS); + tracehook_report_exit(&code); validate_creds_for_do_exit(tsk); _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from nelhage@xxxxxxxxxxx are -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe mm-commits" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html