The patch titled
fs/select.c: fix information leak to userspace
has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is
fs-select-fix-information-leak-to-userspace.patch
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See http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/stuff/added-to-mm.txt to find
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The current -mm tree may be found at http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/
------------------------------------------------------
Subject: fs/select.c: fix information leak to userspace
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@xxxxxxxxx>
On some architectures __kernel_suseconds_t is int. On these archs struct
timeval has padding bytes at the end. This struct is copied to userspace
with these padding bytes uninitialized. This leads to leaking of contents
of kernel stack memory.
This bug was added with v2.6.27-rc5-286-gb773ad4.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/select.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff -puN fs/select.c~fs-select-fix-information-leak-to-userspace fs/select.c
--- a/fs/select.c~fs-select-fix-information-leak-to-userspace
+++ a/fs/select.c
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static int poll_select_copy_remaining(st
rts.tv_sec = rts.tv_nsec = 0;
if (timeval) {
+ memset(&rtv, 0, sizeof(rtv));
rtv.tv_sec = rts.tv_sec;
rtv.tv_usec = rts.tv_nsec / NSEC_PER_USEC;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from segooon@xxxxxxxxx are
origin.patch
drivers-misc-apds9802alsc-fix-signedness-bug.patch
linux-next.patch
fs-select-fix-information-leak-to-userspace.patch
fs-select-fix-information-leak-to-userspace-fix.patch
memstick-core-fix-device_register-error-handling.patch
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