The patch titled
reiserfs: fix permissions on .reiserfs_priv
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
reiserfs-fix-permissions-on-reiserfs_priv.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
The current -mm tree may be found at http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/
------------------------------------------------------
Subject: reiserfs: fix permissions on .reiserfs_priv
From: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@xxxxxxxx>
Commit 677c9b2e393a0cd203bd54e9c18b012b2c73305a ("reiserfs: remove
privroot hiding in lookup") removed the magic from the lookup code to hide
the .reiserfs_priv directory since it was getting loaded at mount-time
instead. The intent was that the entry would be hidden from the user via
a poisoned d_compare, but this was faulty.
This introduced a security issue where unprivileged users could access and
modify extended attributes or ACLs belonging to other users, including
root.
This patch resolves the issue by properly hiding .reiserfs_priv. This was
the intent of the xattr poisoning code, but it appears to have never
worked as expected. This is fixed by using d_revalidate instead of
d_compare.
This patch makes -oexpose_privroot a no-op. I'm fine leaving it this way.
The effort involved in working out the corner cases wrt permissions and
caching outweigh the benefit of the feature.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@xxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Edward Shishkin <edward.shishkin@xxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: Matt McCutchen <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Tested-by: Matt McCutchen <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/reiserfs/dir.c | 2 --
fs/reiserfs/xattr.c | 17 ++++-------------
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff -puN fs/reiserfs/dir.c~reiserfs-fix-permissions-on-reiserfs_priv fs/reiserfs/dir.c
--- a/fs/reiserfs/dir.c~reiserfs-fix-permissions-on-reiserfs_priv
+++ a/fs/reiserfs/dir.c
@@ -46,8 +46,6 @@ static inline bool is_privroot_deh(struc
struct reiserfs_de_head *deh)
{
struct dentry *privroot = REISERFS_SB(dir->d_sb)->priv_root;
- if (reiserfs_expose_privroot(dir->d_sb))
- return 0;
return (dir == dir->d_parent && privroot->d_inode &&
deh->deh_objectid == INODE_PKEY(privroot->d_inode)->k_objectid);
}
diff -puN fs/reiserfs/xattr.c~reiserfs-fix-permissions-on-reiserfs_priv fs/reiserfs/xattr.c
--- a/fs/reiserfs/xattr.c~reiserfs-fix-permissions-on-reiserfs_priv
+++ a/fs/reiserfs/xattr.c
@@ -973,21 +973,13 @@ int reiserfs_permission(struct inode *in
return generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL);
}
-/* This will catch lookups from the fs root to .reiserfs_priv */
-static int
-xattr_lookup_poison(struct dentry *dentry, struct qstr *q1, struct qstr *name)
+static int xattr_hide_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
- struct dentry *priv_root = REISERFS_SB(dentry->d_sb)->priv_root;
- if (container_of(q1, struct dentry, d_name) == priv_root)
- return -ENOENT;
- if (q1->len == name->len &&
- !memcmp(q1->name, name->name, name->len))
- return 0;
- return 1;
+ return -EPERM;
}
static const struct dentry_operations xattr_lookup_poison_ops = {
- .d_compare = xattr_lookup_poison,
+ .d_revalidate = xattr_hide_revalidate,
};
int reiserfs_lookup_privroot(struct super_block *s)
@@ -1001,8 +993,7 @@ int reiserfs_lookup_privroot(struct supe
strlen(PRIVROOT_NAME));
if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
REISERFS_SB(s)->priv_root = dentry;
- if (!reiserfs_expose_privroot(s))
- s->s_root->d_op = &xattr_lookup_poison_ops;
+ dentry->d_op = &xattr_lookup_poison_ops;
if (dentry->d_inode)
dentry->d_inode->i_flags |= S_PRIVATE;
} else
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from jeffm@xxxxxxxx are
origin.patch
linux-next.patch
buffer_head-remove-redundant-test-from-wait_on_buffer.patch
buffer_head-remove-redundant-test-from-wait_on_buffer-fix.patch
wait_on_buffer-remove-the-buffer_locked-test.patch
delayacct-align-to-8-byte-boundary-on-64-bit-systems.patch
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe mm-commits" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
