+ execve-must-clear-current-clear_child_tid.patch added to -mm tree

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The patch titled
     execve: must clear current->clear_child_tid
has been added to the -mm tree.  Its filename is
     execve-must-clear-current-clear_child_tid.patch

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See http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/stuff/added-to-mm.txt to find
out what to do about this

The current -mm tree may be found at http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/

------------------------------------------------------
Subject: execve: must clear current->clear_child_tid
From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@xxxxxxxxx>

While looking at Jens Rosenboom bug report
(http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/7/27/35) about strange sys_futex call done from
a dying "ps" program, we found following problem.

clone() syscall has special support for TID of created threads.  This
support includes two features.

One (CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) is to set an integer into user memory with the
TID value.

One (CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID) is to clear this same integer once the created
thread dies.

The integer location is a user provided pointer, provided at clone()
time.

kernel keeps this pointer value into current->clear_child_tid.

At execve() time, we should make sure kernel doesnt keep this user
provided pointer, as full user memory is replaced by a new one.

As glibc fork() actually uses clone() syscall with CLONE_CHILD_SETTID and
CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID set, chances are high that we might corrupt user
memory in forked processes.

Following sequence could happen:

1) bash (or any program) starts a new process, by a fork() call that
   glibc maps to a clone( ...  CLONE_CHILD_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID
   ...) syscall

2) When new process starts, its current->clear_child_tid is set to a
   location that has a meaning only in bash (or initial program) context
   (&THREAD_SELF->tid)

3) This new process does the execve() syscall to start a new program. 
   current->clear_child_tid is left unchanged (a non NULL value)

4) If this new program creates some threads, and initial thread exits,
   kernel will attempt to clear the integer pointed by
   current->clear_child_tid from mm_release() :

        if (tsk->clear_child_tid
            && !(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED)
            && atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) {
                u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid;
                tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL;

                /*
                 * We don't check the error code - if userspace has
                 * not set up a proper pointer then tough luck.
                 */
<< here >>      put_user(0, tidptr);
                sys_futex(tidptr, FUTEX_WAKE, 1, NULL, NULL, 0);
        }

5) OR : if new program is not multi-threaded, but spied by /proc/pid
   users (ps command for example), mm_users > 1, and the exiting program
   could corrupt 4 bytes in a persistent memory area (shm or memory mapped
   file)

If current->clear_child_tid points to a writeable portion of memory of the
new program, kernel happily and silently corrupts 4 bytes of memory, with
unexpected effects.

Fix is straightforward and should not break any sane program.

Reported-by: Jens Rosenboom <jens@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@xxxxxxxxx>
Tested-by: Jens Rosenboom <jens@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---

 fs/compat.c |    1 +
 fs/exec.c   |    1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff -puN fs/compat.c~execve-must-clear-current-clear_child_tid fs/compat.c
--- a/fs/compat.c~execve-must-clear-current-clear_child_tid
+++ a/fs/compat.c
@@ -1550,6 +1550,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
 	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
 	acct_update_integrals(current);
 	free_bprm(bprm);
+	current->clear_child_tid = NULL;
 	if (displaced)
 		put_files_struct(displaced);
 	return retval;
diff -puN fs/exec.c~execve-must-clear-current-clear_child_tid fs/exec.c
--- a/fs/exec.c~execve-must-clear-current-clear_child_tid
+++ a/fs/exec.c
@@ -1343,6 +1343,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
 	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
 	acct_update_integrals(current);
 	free_bprm(bprm);
+	current->clear_child_tid = NULL;
 	if (displaced)
 		put_files_struct(displaced);
 	return retval;
_

Patches currently in -mm which might be from eric.dumazet@xxxxxxxxx are

linux-next.patch
execve-must-clear-current-clear_child_tid.patch

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