The patch titled Smack: update for file capabilities has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was smack-update-for-file-capabilities.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree The current -mm tree may be found at http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/ ------------------------------------------------------ Subject: Smack: update for file capabilities From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Update the Smack LSM to allow the registration of the capability "module" as a secondary LSM. Integrate the new hooks required for file based capabilities. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@xxxxxx> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff -puN security/smack/smack_lsm.c~smack-update-for-file-capabilities security/smack/smack_lsm.c --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c~smack-update-for-file-capabilities +++ a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -584,14 +584,20 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vf static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || - strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 || - strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) - return -EPERM; - } + int rc = 0; + + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) { + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + rc = -EPERM; + } else + rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); + + if (rc == 0) + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE); - return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE); + return rc; } /** @@ -658,10 +664,20 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct d */ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name) { - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 && !capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; + int rc = 0; - return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE); + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) { + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + rc = -EPERM; + } else + rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); + + if (rc == 0) + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE); + + return rc; } /** @@ -1016,7 +1032,12 @@ static void smack_task_getsecid(struct t */ static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) { - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + int rc; + + rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice); + if (rc == 0) + rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + return rc; } /** @@ -1028,7 +1049,12 @@ static int smack_task_setnice(struct tas */ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) { - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + int rc; + + rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio); + if (rc == 0) + rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + return rc; } /** @@ -1053,7 +1079,12 @@ static int smack_task_getioprio(struct t static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp) { - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + int rc; + + rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp); + if (rc == 0) + rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + return rc; } /** @@ -1093,6 +1124,11 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid) { + int rc; + + rc = cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; /* * Special cases where signals really ought to go through * in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may @@ -1778,6 +1814,27 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct k return smk_curacc(isp, may); } +/* module stacking operations */ + +/** + * smack_register_security - stack capability module + * @name: module name + * @ops: module operations - ignored + * + * Allow the capability module to register. + */ +static int smack_register_security(const char *name, + struct security_operations *ops) +{ + if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n", + __func__, name); + + return 0; +} + /** * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode * @opt_dentry: unused @@ -2412,6 +2469,8 @@ static struct security_operations smack_ .inode_post_setxattr = smack_inode_post_setxattr, .inode_getxattr = smack_inode_getxattr, .inode_removexattr = smack_inode_removexattr, + .inode_need_killpriv = cap_inode_need_killpriv, + .inode_killpriv = cap_inode_killpriv, .inode_getsecurity = smack_inode_getsecurity, .inode_setsecurity = smack_inode_setsecurity, .inode_listsecurity = smack_inode_listsecurity, @@ -2471,6 +2530,8 @@ static struct security_operations smack_ .netlink_send = cap_netlink_send, .netlink_recv = cap_netlink_recv, + .register_security = smack_register_security, + .d_instantiate = smack_d_instantiate, .getprocattr = smack_getprocattr, _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx are - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe mm-commits" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html