The patch titled Fix filesystem capability support has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was fix-filesystem-capability-support.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree The current -mm tree may be found at http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/ ------------------------------------------------------ Subject: Fix filesystem capability support From: "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@xxxxxxxxxx> In linux-2.6.24-rc1, security/commoncap.c:cap_inh_is_capped() was introduced. It has the exact reverse of its intended behavior. This led to an unintended privilege esculation involving a process' inheritable capability set. To be exposed to this bug, you need to have Filesystem Capabilities enabled and in use. That is: - CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES must be defined for the buggy code to be compiled in. - You also need to have files on your system marked with fI bits raised. Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- security/commoncap.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff -puN security/commoncap.c~fix-filesystem-capability-support security/commoncap.c --- a/security/commoncap.c~fix-filesystem-capability-support +++ a/security/commoncap.c @@ -59,6 +59,12 @@ int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv); +/* + * NOTE WELL: cap_capable() cannot be used like the kernel's capable() + * function. That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable() + * returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable() + * returns 1 for this case. + */ int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) { /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */ @@ -107,10 +113,11 @@ static inline int cap_block_setpcap(stru static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) { /* - * return 1 if changes to the inheritable set are limited - * to the old permitted set. + * Return 1 if changes to the inheritable set are limited + * to the old permitted set. That is, if the current task + * does *not* possess the CAP_SETPCAP capability. */ - return !cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP); + return (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0); } #else /* ie., ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from morgan@xxxxxxxxxx are revert-capabilities-clean-up-file-capability-reading.patch revert-capabilities-clean-up-file-capability-reading-checkpatch-fixes.patch add-64-bit-capability-support-to-the-kernel.patch add-64-bit-capability-support-to-the-kernel-checkpatch-fixes.patch add-64-bit-capability-support-to-the-kernel-fix.patch add-64-bit-capability-support-to-the-kernel-fix-fix.patch add-64-bit-capability-support-to-the-kernel-fix-modify-old-libcap-warning-message.patch add-64-bit-capability-support-to-the-kernel-fix-modify-old-libcap-warning-message-checkpatch-fixes.patch add-64-bit-capability-support-to-the-kernel-fix-modify-old-libcap-warning-message-fix.patch 64bit-capability-support-legacy-support-fix.patch remove-unnecessary-include-from-include-linux-capabilityh.patch capabilities-introduce-per-process-capability-bounding-set.patch oom_kill-remove-uid==0-checks.patch smack-version-11c-simplified-mandatory-access-control-kernel.patch smack-using-capabilities-32-and-33.patch smack-mutex-capability-pointers-and-spelling-cleanup.patch smack-socket-label-setting-fix.patch proc-seqfile-convert-proc_pid_status-to-properly-handle-pid-namespaces.patch proc-seqfile-convert-proc_pid_status-to-properly-handle-pid-namespaces-checkpatch-fixes.patch proc-seqfile-convert-proc_pid_status-to-properly-handle-pid-namespaces-fix.patch - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe mm-commits" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html