The patch titled user ns: hook permission has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is user-ns-hook-permission.patch See http://www.zip.com.au/~akpm/linux/patches/stuff/added-to-mm.txt to find out what to do about this ------------------------------------------------------ Subject: user ns: hook permission From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@xxxxxxxxxx> Hook permission to check vfsmnt->user_ns against current. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@xxxxx> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxx> --- fs/namei.c | 4 ++++ 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+) diff -puN fs/namei.c~user-ns-hook-permission fs/namei.c --- a/fs/namei.c~user-ns-hook-permission +++ a/fs/namei.c @@ -246,6 +246,8 @@ int permission(struct inode *inode, int return -EACCES; } + if (nd && !task_mnt_same_uidns(current, nd->mnt)) + return -EACCES; /* * MAY_EXEC on regular files requires special handling: We override @@ -433,6 +435,8 @@ static int exec_permission_lite(struct i { umode_t mode = inode->i_mode; + if (!task_mnt_same_uidns(current, nd->mnt)) + return -EACCES; if (inode->i_op && inode->i_op->permission) return -EAGAIN; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from serue@xxxxxxxxxx are implement-file-posix-capabilities.patch file-capabilities-dont-do-file-caps-if-mnt_nosuid.patch file-capabilities-honor-secure_noroot.patch nsproxy-externalizes-exit_task_namespaces.patch user-namespace-add-the-framework.patch user-namespace-add-the-framework-fix.patch user-ns-add-user_namespace-ptr-to-vfsmount.patch user-ns-hook-permission.patch user-ns-prepare-copy_tree-copy_mnt-and-their-callers-to-handle-errs.patch user-ns-prepare-copy_tree-copy_mnt-and-their-callers-to-handle-errs-fix.patch user-ns-implement-shared-mounts.patch user_ns-handle-file-sigio.patch user-ns-implement-user-ns-unshare.patch user-ns-implement-user-ns-unshare-tidy.patch - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe mm-commits" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html