The quilt patch titled
Subject: mseal: update mseal.rst
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
mseal-update-msealrst.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: mseal: update mseal.rst
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2024 04:09:41 +0000
Pedro Falcato's optimization [1] for checking sealed VMAs, which replaces
the can_modify_mm() function with an in-loop check, necessitates an update
to the mseal.rst documentation to reflect this change.
Furthermore, the document has received offline comments regarding the code
sample and suggestions for sentence clarification to enhance reader
comprehension.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20240817-mseal-depessimize-v3-0-d8d2e037df30@xxxxxxxxx/
Update doc after in-loop change: mprotect/madvise can have
partially updated and munmap is atomic.
Fix indentation and clarify some sections to improve readability.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241008040942.1478931-2-jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx
Fixes: df2a7df9a9aa ("mm/munmap: replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma")
Fixes: 4a2dd02b0916 ("mm/mprotect: replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma")
Fixes: 38075679b5f1 ("mm/mremap: replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma")
Fixes: 23c57d1fa2b9 ("mseal: replace can_modify_mm_madv with a vma variant")
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Elliott Hughes <enh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: "Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: "Theo de Raadt" <deraadt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst | 305 +++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 147 insertions(+), 158 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst~mseal-update-msealrst
+++ a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
@@ -23,177 +23,166 @@ applications can additionally seal secur
A similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the
VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT flag [1] and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall [2].
-User API
-========
-mseal()
------------
-The mseal() syscall has the following signature:
+SYSCALL
+=======
+mseal syscall signature
+-----------------------
+ ``int mseal(void \* addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)``
+
+ **addr**/**len**: virtual memory address range.
+ The address range set by **addr**/**len** must meet:
+ - The start address must be in an allocated VMA.
+ - The start address must be page aligned.
+ - The end address (**addr** + **len**) must be in an allocated VMA.
+ - no gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address.
+
+ The ``len`` will be paged aligned implicitly by the kernel.
+
+ **flags**: reserved for future use.
+
+ **Return values**:
+ - **0**: Success.
+ - **-EINVAL**:
+ * Invalid input ``flags``.
+ * The start address (``addr``) is not page aligned.
+ * Address range (``addr`` + ``len``) overflow.
+ - **-ENOMEM**:
+ * The start address (``addr``) is not allocated.
+ * The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) is not allocated.
+ * A gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address.
+ - **-EPERM**:
+ * sealing is supported only on 64-bit CPUs, 32-bit is not supported.
+
+ **Note about error return**:
+ - For above error cases, users can expect the given memory range is
+ unmodified, i.e. no partial update.
+ - There might be other internal errors/cases not listed here, e.g.
+ error during merging/splitting VMAs, or the process reaching the maximum
+ number of supported VMAs. In those cases, partial updates to the given
+ memory range could happen. However, those cases should be rare.
+
+ **Architecture support**:
+ mseal only works on 64-bit CPUs, not 32-bit CPUs.
+
+ **Idempotent**:
+ users can call mseal multiple times. mseal on an already sealed memory
+ is a no-action (not error).
+
+ **no munseal**
+ Once mapping is sealed, it can't be unsealed. The kernel should never
+ have munseal, this is consistent with other sealing feature, e.g.
+ F_SEAL_SEAL for file.
+
+Blocked mm syscall for sealed mapping
+-------------------------------------
+ It might be important to note: **once the mapping is sealed, it will
+ stay in the process's memory until the process terminates**.
+
+ Example::
+
+ *ptr = mmap(0, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, 0, 0);
+ rc = mseal(ptr, 4096, 0);
+ /* munmap will fail */
+ rc = munmap(ptr, 4096);
+ assert(rc < 0);
+
+ Blocked mm syscall:
+ - munmap
+ - mmap
+ - mremap
+ - mprotect and pkey_mprotect
+ - some destructive madvise behaviors: MADV_DONTNEED, MADV_FREE,
+ MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED, MADV_FREE, MADV_DONTFORK, MADV_WIPEONFORK
+
+ The first set of syscalls to block is munmap, mremap, mmap. They can
+ either leave an empty space in the address space, therefore allowing
+ replacement with a new mapping with new set of attributes, or can
+ overwrite the existing mapping with another mapping.
+
+ mprotect and pkey_mprotect are blocked because they changes the
+ protection bits (RWX) of the mapping.
+
+ Certain destructive madvise behaviors, specifically MADV_DONTNEED,
+ MADV_FREE, MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED, and MADV_WIPEONFORK, can introduce
+ risks when applied to anonymous memory by threads lacking write
+ permissions. Consequently, these operations are prohibited under such
+ conditions. The aforementioned behaviors have the potential to modify
+ region contents by discarding pages, effectively performing a memset(0)
+ operation on the anonymous memory.
+
+ Kernel will return -EPERM for blocked syscalls.
+
+ When blocked syscall return -EPERM due to sealing, the memory regions may
+ or may not be changed, depends on the syscall being blocked:
+
+ - munmap: munmap is atomic. If one of VMAs in the given range is
+ sealed, none of VMAs are updated.
+ - mprotect, pkey_mprotect, madvise: partial update might happen, e.g.
+ when mprotect over multiple VMAs, mprotect might update the beginning
+ VMAs before reaching the sealed VMA and return -EPERM.
+ - mmap and mremap: undefined behavior.
-``int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)``
-
-**addr/len**: virtual memory address range.
-
-The address range set by ``addr``/``len`` must meet:
- - The start address must be in an allocated VMA.
- - The start address must be page aligned.
- - The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) must be in an allocated VMA.
- - no gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address.
-
-The ``len`` will be paged aligned implicitly by the kernel.
-
-**flags**: reserved for future use.
-
-**return values**:
-
-- ``0``: Success.
-
-- ``-EINVAL``:
- - Invalid input ``flags``.
- - The start address (``addr``) is not page aligned.
- - Address range (``addr`` + ``len``) overflow.
-
-- ``-ENOMEM``:
- - The start address (``addr``) is not allocated.
- - The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) is not allocated.
- - A gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address.
-
-- ``-EPERM``:
- - sealing is supported only on 64-bit CPUs, 32-bit is not supported.
-
-- For above error cases, users can expect the given memory range is
- unmodified, i.e. no partial update.
-
-- There might be other internal errors/cases not listed here, e.g.
- error during merging/splitting VMAs, or the process reaching the max
- number of supported VMAs. In those cases, partial updates to the given
- memory range could happen. However, those cases should be rare.
-
-**Blocked operations after sealing**:
- Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
- via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore
- can be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.
-
- Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
- via mremap().
-
- Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
-
- Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any
- specific risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because
- the use case is unclear. In any case, users can rely on
- merging to expand a sealed VMA.
-
- mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().
-
- Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED)
- for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the
- memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages,
- effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory.
-
- Kernel will return -EPERM for blocked operations.
-
- For blocked operations, one can expect the given address is unmodified,
- i.e. no partial update. Note, this is different from existing mm
- system call behaviors, where partial updates are made till an error is
- found and returned to userspace. To give an example:
-
- Assume following code sequence:
-
- - ptr = mmap(null, 8192, PROT_NONE);
- - munmap(ptr + 4096, 4096);
- - ret1 = mprotect(ptr, 8192, PROT_READ);
- - mseal(ptr, 4096);
- - ret2 = mprotect(ptr, 8192, PROT_NONE);
-
- ret1 will be -ENOMEM, the page from ptr is updated to PROT_READ.
-
- ret2 will be -EPERM, the page remains to be PROT_READ.
-
-**Note**:
-
-- mseal() only works on 64-bit CPUs, not 32-bit CPU.
-
-- users can call mseal() multiple times, mseal() on an already sealed memory
- is a no-action (not error).
-
-- munseal() is not supported.
-
-Use cases:
-==========
+Use cases
+=========
- glibc:
The dynamic linker, during loading ELF executables, can apply sealing to
- non-writable memory segments.
-
-- Chrome browser: protect some security sensitive data-structures.
+ mapping segments.
-Notes on which memory to seal:
-==============================
+- Chrome browser: protect some security sensitive data structures.
-It might be important to note that sealing changes the lifetime of a mapping,
-i.e. the sealed mapping wonâ??t be unmapped till the process terminates or the
-exec system call is invoked. Applications can apply sealing to any virtual
-memory region from userspace, but it is crucial to thoroughly analyze the
-mapping's lifetime prior to apply the sealing.
+When not to use mseal
+=====================
+Applications can apply sealing to any virtual memory region from userspace,
+but it is *crucial to thoroughly analyze the mapping's lifetime* prior to
+apply the sealing. This is because the sealed mapping *wonâ??t be unmapped*
+until the process terminates or the exec system call is invoked.
For example:
+ - aio/shm
+ aio/shm can call mmap and munmap on behalf of userspace, e.g.
+ ksys_shmdt() in shm.c. The lifetimes of those mapping are not tied to
+ the lifetime of the process. If those memories are sealed from userspace,
+ then munmap will fail, causing leaks in VMA address space during the
+ lifetime of the process.
+
+ - ptr allocated by malloc (heap)
+ Don't use mseal on the memory ptr return from malloc().
+ malloc() is implemented by allocator, e.g. by glibc. Heap manager might
+ allocate a ptr from brk or mapping created by mmap.
+ If an app calls mseal on a ptr returned from malloc(), this can affect
+ the heap manager's ability to manage the mappings; the outcome is
+ non-deterministic.
+
+ Example::
+
+ ptr = malloc(size);
+ /* don't call mseal on ptr return from malloc. */
+ mseal(ptr, size);
+ /* free will success, allocator can't shrink heap lower than ptr */
+ free(ptr);
+
+mseal doesn't block
+===================
+In a nutshell, mseal blocks certain mm syscall from modifying some of VMA's
+attributes, such as protection bits (RWX). Sealed mappings doesn't mean the
+memory is immutable.
-- aio/shm
-
- aio/shm can call mmap()/munmap() on behalf of userspace, e.g. ksys_shmdt() in
- shm.c. The lifetime of those mapping are not tied to the lifetime of the
- process. If those memories are sealed from userspace, then munmap() will fail,
- causing leaks in VMA address space during the lifetime of the process.
-
-- Brk (heap)
-
- Currently, userspace applications can seal parts of the heap by calling
- malloc() and mseal().
- let's assume following calls from user space:
-
- - ptr = malloc(size);
- - mprotect(ptr, size, RO);
- - mseal(ptr, size);
- - free(ptr);
-
- Technically, before mseal() is added, the user can change the protection of
- the heap by calling mprotect(RO). As long as the user changes the protection
- back to RW before free(), the memory range can be reused.
-
- Adding mseal() into the picture, however, the heap is then sealed partially,
- the user can still free it, but the memory remains to be RO. If the address
- is re-used by the heap manager for another malloc, the process might crash
- soon after. Therefore, it is important not to apply sealing to any memory
- that might get recycled.
-
- Furthermore, even if the application never calls the free() for the ptr,
- the heap manager may invoke the brk system call to shrink the size of the
- heap. In the kernel, the brk-shrink will call munmap(). Consequently,
- depending on the location of the ptr, the outcome of brk-shrink is
- nondeterministic.
-
-
-Additional notes:
-=================
As Jann Horn pointed out in [3], there are still a few ways to write
-to RO memory, which is, in a way, by design. Those cases are not covered
-by mseal(). If applications want to block such cases, sandbox tools (such as
-seccomp, LSM, etc) might be considered.
+to RO memory, which is, in a way, by design. And those could be blocked
+by different security measures.
Those cases are:
-- Write to read-only memory through /proc/self/mem interface.
-- Write to read-only memory through ptrace (such as PTRACE_POKETEXT).
-- userfaultfd.
+ - Write to read-only memory through /proc/self/mem interface (FOLL_FORCE).
+ - Write to read-only memory through ptrace (such as PTRACE_POKETEXT).
+ - userfaultfd.
The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttgerâ??s work in V8
CFI [4]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this API.
-Reference:
-==========
-[1] https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/1031c584a5e37aff177559b9f69dbd3c8c3fd30a/osfmk/mach/vm_statistics.h#L274
-
-[2] https://man.openbsd.org/mimmutable.2
-
-[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3ShUYey+ZAFsU2i1RpQn0a5eOs2hzQ426FkcgnfUGLvA@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
-
-[4] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1O2jwK4dxI3nRcOJuPYkonhTkNQfbmwdvxQMyXgeaRHo/edit#heading=h.bvaojj9fu6hc
+Reference
+=========
+- [1] https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/1031c584a5e37aff177559b9f69dbd3c8c3fd30a/osfmk/mach/vm_statistics.h#L274
+- [2] https://man.openbsd.org/mimmutable.2
+- [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3ShUYey+ZAFsU2i1RpQn0a5eOs2hzQ426FkcgnfUGLvA@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
+- [4] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1O2jwK4dxI3nRcOJuPYkonhTkNQfbmwdvxQMyXgeaRHo/edit#heading=h.bvaojj9fu6hc
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx are
