[merged mm-stable] kmsan-support-slab_poison.patch removed from -mm tree

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



The quilt patch titled
     Subject: kmsan: support SLAB_POISON
has been removed from the -mm tree.  Its filename was
     kmsan-support-slab_poison.patch

This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm

------------------------------------------------------
From: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: kmsan: support SLAB_POISON
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 13:34:57 +0200

Avoid false KMSAN negatives with SLUB_DEBUG by allowing kmsan_slab_free()
to poison the freed memory, and by preventing init_object() from
unpoisoning new allocations by using __memset().

There are two alternatives to this approach.  First, init_object() can be
marked with __no_sanitize_memory.  This annotation should be used with
great care, because it drops all instrumentation from the function, and
any shadow writes will be lost.  Even though this is not a concern with
the current init_object() implementation, this may change in the future.

Second, kmsan_poison_memory() calls may be added after memset() calls. 
The downside is that init_object() is called from free_debug_processing(),
in which case poisoning will erase the distinction between simply
uninitialized memory and UAF.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-14-iii@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@xxxxxxx>
Cc: <kasan-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---

 mm/kmsan/hooks.c |    2 +-
 mm/slub.c        |   15 +++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c~kmsan-support-slab_poison
+++ a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ void kmsan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *
 		return;
 
 	/* RCU slabs could be legally used after free within the RCU period */
-	if (unlikely(s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)))
+	if (unlikely(s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
 		return;
 	/*
 	 * If there's a constructor, freed memory must remain in the same state
--- a/mm/slub.c~kmsan-support-slab_poison
+++ a/mm/slub.c
@@ -1139,7 +1139,13 @@ static void init_object(struct kmem_cach
 	unsigned int poison_size = s->object_size;
 
 	if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
-		memset(p - s->red_left_pad, val, s->red_left_pad);
+		/*
+		 * Here and below, avoid overwriting the KMSAN shadow. Keeping
+		 * the shadow makes it possible to distinguish uninit-value
+		 * from use-after-free.
+		 */
+		memset_no_sanitize_memory(p - s->red_left_pad, val,
+					  s->red_left_pad);
 
 		if (slub_debug_orig_size(s) && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE) {
 			/*
@@ -1152,12 +1158,13 @@ static void init_object(struct kmem_cach
 	}
 
 	if (s->flags & __OBJECT_POISON) {
-		memset(p, POISON_FREE, poison_size - 1);
-		p[poison_size - 1] = POISON_END;
+		memset_no_sanitize_memory(p, POISON_FREE, poison_size - 1);
+		memset_no_sanitize_memory(p + poison_size - 1, POISON_END, 1);
 	}
 
 	if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE)
-		memset(p + poison_size, val, s->inuse - poison_size);
+		memset_no_sanitize_memory(p + poison_size, val,
+					  s->inuse - poison_size);
 }
 
 static void restore_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, char *message, u8 data,
_

Patches currently in -mm which might be from iii@xxxxxxxxxxxxx are






[Index of Archives]     [Kernel Archive]     [IETF Annouce]     [DCCP]     [Netdev]     [Networking]     [Security]     [Bugtraq]     [Yosemite]     [MIPS Linux]     [ARM Linux]     [Linux Security]     [Linux RAID]     [Linux SCSI]

  Powered by Linux