The patch titled
Subject: mm: kfence: disable KMSAN when checking the canary
has been added to the -mm mm-unstable branch. Its filename is
mm-kfence-disable-kmsan-when-checking-the-canary.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patches/mm-kfence-disable-kmsan-when-checking-the-canary.patch
This patch will later appear in the mm-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
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------------------------------------------------------
From: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: mm: kfence: disable KMSAN when checking the canary
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2024 17:34:19 +0200
KMSAN warns about check_canary() accessing the canary.
The reason is that, even though set_canary() is properly instrumented
and sets shadow, slub explicitly poisons the canary's address range
afterwards.
Unpoisoning the canary is not the right thing to do: only
check_canary() is supposed to ever touch it. Instead, disable KMSAN
checks around canary read accesses.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240613153924.961511-18-iii@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@xxxxxxxxxx>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
mm/kfence/core.c | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/kfence/core.c~mm-kfence-disable-kmsan-when-checking-the-canary
+++ a/mm/kfence/core.c
@@ -305,8 +305,14 @@ metadata_update_state(struct kfence_meta
WRITE_ONCE(meta->state, next);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
+#define CHECK_CANARY_ATTRIBUTES noinline __no_kmsan_checks
+#else
+#define CHECK_CANARY_ATTRIBUTES inline
+#endif
+
/* Check canary byte at @addr. */
-static inline bool check_canary_byte(u8 *addr)
+static CHECK_CANARY_ATTRIBUTES bool check_canary_byte(u8 *addr)
{
struct kfence_metadata *meta;
unsigned long flags;
@@ -341,7 +347,8 @@ static inline void set_canary(const stru
*((u64 *)addr) = KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN_U64;
}
-static inline void check_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
+static CHECK_CANARY_ATTRIBUTES void
+check_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
{
const unsigned long pageaddr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, PAGE_SIZE);
unsigned long addr = pageaddr;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from iii@xxxxxxxxxxxxx are
ftrace-unpoison-ftrace_regs-in-ftrace_ops_list_func.patch
kmsan-make-the-tests-compatible-with-kmsanpanic=1.patch
kmsan-disable-kmsan-when-deferred_struct_page_init-is-enabled.patch
kmsan-increase-the-maximum-store-size-to-4096.patch
kmsan-fix-is_bad_asm_addr-on-arches-with-overlapping-address-spaces.patch
kmsan-fix-kmsan_copy_to_user-on-arches-with-overlapping-address-spaces.patch
kmsan-remove-a-useless-assignment-from-kmsan_vmap_pages_range_noflush.patch
kmsan-remove-an-x86-specific-include-from-kmsanh.patch
kmsan-expose-kmsan_get_metadata.patch
kmsan-export-panic_on_kmsan.patch
kmsan-allow-disabling-kmsan-checks-for-the-current-task.patch
kmsan-support-slab_poison.patch
kmsan-use-align_down-in-kmsan_get_metadata.patch
kmsan-do-not-round-up-pg_data_t-size.patch
mm-slub-let-kmsan-access-metadata.patch
mm-slub-unpoison-the-memchr_inv-return-value.patch
mm-kfence-disable-kmsan-when-checking-the-canary.patch
lib-zlib-unpoison-dfltcc-output-buffers.patch
kmsan-accept-ranges-starting-with-0-on-s390.patch
s390-boot-turn-off-kmsan.patch
s390-use-a-larger-stack-for-kmsan.patch
s390-boot-add-the-kmsan-runtime-stub.patch
s390-checksum-add-a-kmsan-check.patch
s390-cpacf-unpoison-the-results-of-cpacf_trng.patch
s390-cpumf-unpoison-stcctm-output-buffer.patch
s390-diag-unpoison-diag224-output-buffer.patch
s390-ftrace-unpoison-ftrace_regs-in-kprobe_ftrace_handler.patch
s390-irqflags-do-not-instrument-arch_local_irq_-with-kmsan.patch
s390-mm-define-kmsan-metadata-for-vmalloc-and-modules.patch
s390-string-add-kmsan-support.patch
s390-traps-unpoison-the-kernel_stack_overflows-pt_regs.patch
s390-uaccess-add-kmsan-support-to-put_user-and-get_user.patch
s390-unwind-disable-kmsan-checks.patch
s390-implement-the-architecture-specific-kmsan-functions.patch
kmsan-enable-on-s390.patch
