The quilt patch titled
Subject: mseal: wire up mseal syscall
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: mseal: wire up mseal syscall
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2024 16:35:20 +0000
Patch series "Introduce mseal", v10.
This patchset proposes a new mseal() syscall for the Linux kernel.
In a nutshell, mseal() protects the VMAs of a given virtual memory range
against modifications, such as changes to their permission bits.
Modern CPUs support memory permissions, such as the read/write (RW) and
no-execute (NX) bits. Linux has supported NX since the release of kernel
version 2.6.8 in August 2004 [1]. The memory permission feature improves
the security stance on memory corruption bugs, as an attacker cannot
simply write to arbitrary memory and point the code to it. The memory
must be marked with the X bit, or else an exception will occur.
Internally, the kernel maintains the memory permissions in a data
structure called VMA (vm_area_struct). mseal() additionally protects the
VMA itself against modifications of the selected seal type.
Memory sealing is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a
corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For example,
such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees
since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writable
or .text pages can get remapped. Memory sealing can automatically be
applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and .rodata pages and
applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime. A
similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the
VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT [3] flag and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall
[4]. Also, Chrome wants to adopt this feature for their CFI work [2] and
this patchset has been designed to be compatible with the Chrome use case.
Two system calls are involved in sealing the map: mmap() and mseal().
The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature:
int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
addr/len: memory range.
flags: reserved.
mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range.
1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can
be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.
2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
via mremap().
3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific
risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is
unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA.
5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().
6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous
memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those
behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a
memset(0) for anonymous memory.
The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttgerâ??s work in
V8 CFI [5]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this
API.
Indeed, the Chrome browser has very specific requirements for sealing,
which are distinct from those of most applications. For example, in the
case of libc, sealing is only applied to read-only (RO) or read-execute
(RX) memory segments (such as .text and .RELRO) to prevent them from
becoming writable, the lifetime of those mappings are tied to the lifetime
of the process.
Chrome wants to seal two large address space reservations that are managed
by different allocators. The memory is mapped RW- and RWX respectively
but write access to it is restricted using pkeys (or in the future ARM
permission overlay extensions). The lifetime of those mappings are not
tied to the lifetime of the process, therefore, while the memory is
sealed, the allocators still need to free or discard the unused memory.
For example, with madvise(DONTNEED).
However, always allowing madvise(DONTNEED) on this range poses a security
risk. For example if a jump instruction crosses a page boundary and the
second page gets discarded, it will overwrite the target bytes with zeros
and change the control flow. Checking write-permission before the discard
operation allows us to control when the operation is valid. In this case,
the madvise will only succeed if the executing thread has PKEY write
permissions and PKRU changes are protected in software by control-flow
integrity.
Although the initial version of this patch series is targeting the Chrome
browser as its first user, it became evident during upstream discussions
that we would also want to ensure that the patch set eventually is a
complete solution for memory sealing and compatible with other use cases.
The specific scenario currently in mind is glibc's use case of loading and
sealing ELF executables. To this end, Stephen is working on a change to
glibc to add sealing support to the dynamic linker, which will seal all
non-writable segments at startup. Once this work is completed, all
applications will be able to automatically benefit from these new
protections.
In closing, I would like to formally acknowledge the valuable
contributions received during the RFC process, which were instrumental in
shaping this patch:
Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the
destructive madvise operations.
Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization.
Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope.
Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from
implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD.
MM perf benchmarks
==================
This patch adds a loop in the mprotect/munmap/madvise(DONTNEED) to
check the VMAsâ?? sealing flag, so that no partial update can be made,
when any segment within the given memory range is sealed.
To measure the performance impact of this loop, two tests are developed.
[8]
The first is measuring the time taken for a particular system call,
by using clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC). The second is using
PERF_COUNT_HW_REF_CPU_CYCLES (exclude user space). Both tests have
similar results.
The tests have roughly below sequence:
for (i = 0; i < 1000, i++)
create 1000 mappings (1 page per VMA)
start the sampling
for (j = 0; j < 1000, j++)
mprotect one mapping
stop and save the sample
delete 1000 mappings
calculates all samples.
Below tests are performed on Intel(R) Pentium(R) Gold 7505 @ 2.00GHz,
4G memory, Chromebook.
Based on the latest upstream code:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t t_mseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 909 944 35 35 104%
munmap__ 2 1398 1502 104 52 107%
munmap__ 4 2444 2594 149 37 106%
munmap__ 8 4029 4323 293 37 107%
munmap__ 16 6647 6935 288 18 104%
munmap__ 32 11811 12398 587 18 105%
mprotect 1 439 465 26 26 106%
mprotect 2 1659 1745 86 43 105%
mprotect 4 3747 3889 142 36 104%
mprotect 8 6755 6969 215 27 103%
mprotect 16 13748 14144 396 25 103%
mprotect 32 27827 28969 1142 36 104%
madvise_ 1 240 262 22 22 109%
madvise_ 2 366 442 76 38 121%
madvise_ 4 623 751 128 32 121%
madvise_ 8 1110 1324 215 27 119%
madvise_ 16 2127 2451 324 20 115%
madvise_ 32 4109 4642 534 17 113%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 1790 1890 100 100 106%
munmap__ 2 2819 3033 214 107 108%
munmap__ 4 4959 5271 312 78 106%
munmap__ 8 8262 8745 483 60 106%
munmap__ 16 13099 14116 1017 64 108%
munmap__ 32 23221 24785 1565 49 107%
mprotect 1 906 967 62 62 107%
mprotect 2 3019 3203 184 92 106%
mprotect 4 6149 6569 420 105 107%
mprotect 8 9978 10524 545 68 105%
mprotect 16 20448 21427 979 61 105%
mprotect 32 40972 42935 1963 61 105%
madvise_ 1 434 497 63 63 115%
madvise_ 2 752 899 147 74 120%
madvise_ 4 1313 1513 200 50 115%
madvise_ 8 2271 2627 356 44 116%
madvise_ 16 4312 4883 571 36 113%
madvise_ 32 8376 9319 943 29 111%
Based on the result, for 6.8 kernel, sealing check adds
20-40 nano seconds, or around 50-100 CPU cycles, per VMA.
In addition, I applied the sealing to 5.10 kernel:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t tmseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 390 33 33 109%
munmap__ 2 442 463 21 11 105%
munmap__ 4 614 634 20 5 103%
munmap__ 8 1017 1137 120 15 112%
munmap__ 16 1889 2153 263 16 114%
munmap__ 32 4109 4088 -21 -1 99%
mprotect 1 235 227 -7 -7 97%
mprotect 2 495 464 -30 -15 94%
mprotect 4 741 764 24 6 103%
mprotect 8 1434 1437 2 0 100%
mprotect 16 2958 2991 33 2 101%
mprotect 32 6431 6608 177 6 103%
madvise_ 1 191 208 16 16 109%
madvise_ 2 300 324 24 12 108%
madvise_ 4 450 473 23 6 105%
madvise_ 8 753 806 53 7 107%
madvise_ 16 1467 1592 125 8 108%
madvise_ 32 2795 3405 610 19 122%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ nbr_vma cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 715 31 31 105%
munmap__ 2 861 898 38 19 104%
munmap__ 4 1183 1235 51 13 104%
munmap__ 8 1999 2045 46 6 102%
munmap__ 16 3839 3816 -23 -1 99%
munmap__ 32 7672 7887 216 7 103%
mprotect 1 397 443 46 46 112%
mprotect 2 738 788 50 25 107%
mprotect 4 1221 1256 35 9 103%
mprotect 8 2356 2429 72 9 103%
mprotect 16 4961 4935 -26 -2 99%
mprotect 32 9882 10172 291 9 103%
madvise_ 1 351 380 29 29 108%
madvise_ 2 565 615 49 25 109%
madvise_ 4 872 933 61 15 107%
madvise_ 8 1508 1640 132 16 109%
madvise_ 16 3078 3323 245 15 108%
madvise_ 32 5893 6704 811 25 114%
For 5.10 kernel, sealing check adds 0-15 ns in time, or 10-30
CPU cycles, there is even decrease in some cases.
It might be interesting to compare 5.10 and 6.8 kernel
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t_5_10 t_6_8 delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 909 552 552 254%
munmap__ 2 442 1398 956 478 316%
munmap__ 4 614 2444 1830 458 398%
munmap__ 8 1017 4029 3012 377 396%
munmap__ 16 1889 6647 4758 297 352%
munmap__ 32 4109 11811 7702 241 287%
mprotect 1 235 439 204 204 187%
mprotect 2 495 1659 1164 582 335%
mprotect 4 741 3747 3006 752 506%
mprotect 8 1434 6755 5320 665 471%
mprotect 16 2958 13748 10790 674 465%
mprotect 32 6431 27827 21397 669 433%
madvise_ 1 191 240 49 49 125%
madvise_ 2 300 366 67 33 122%
madvise_ 4 450 623 173 43 138%
madvise_ 8 753 1110 357 45 147%
madvise_ 16 1467 2127 660 41 145%
madvise_ 32 2795 4109 1314 41 147%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu_5_10 c_6_8 delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 1790 1106 1106 262%
munmap__ 2 861 2819 1958 979 327%
munmap__ 4 1183 4959 3776 944 419%
munmap__ 8 1999 8262 6263 783 413%
munmap__ 16 3839 13099 9260 579 341%
munmap__ 32 7672 23221 15549 486 303%
mprotect 1 397 906 509 509 228%
mprotect 2 738 3019 2281 1140 409%
mprotect 4 1221 6149 4929 1232 504%
mprotect 8 2356 9978 7622 953 423%
mprotect 16 4961 20448 15487 968 412%
mprotect 32 9882 40972 31091 972 415%
madvise_ 1 351 434 82 82 123%
madvise_ 2 565 752 186 93 133%
madvise_ 4 872 1313 442 110 151%
madvise_ 8 1508 2271 763 95 151%
madvise_ 16 3078 4312 1234 77 140%
madvise_ 32 5893 8376 2483 78 142%
>From 5.10 to 6.8
munmap: added 250-550 ns in time, or 500-1100 in cpu cycle, per vma.
mprotect: added 200-750 ns in time, or 500-1200 in cpu cycle, per vma.
madvise: added 33-50 ns in time, or 70-110 in cpu cycle, per vma.
In comparison to mseal, which adds 20-40 ns or 50-100 CPU cycles, the
increase from 5.10 to 6.8 is significantly larger, approximately ten times
greater for munmap and mprotect.
When I discuss the mm performance with Brian Makin, an engineer who worked
on performance, it was brought to my attention that such performance
benchmarks, which measuring millions of mm syscall in a tight loop, may
not accurately reflect real-world scenarios, such as that of a database
service. Also this is tested using a single HW and ChromeOS, the data
from another HW or distribution might be different. It might be best to
take this data with a grain of salt.
This patch (of 5):
Wire up mseal syscall for all architectures.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-1-jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-2-jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> [Bug #2]
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 ++
arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 1 +
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 +
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 1 +
arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 5 ++++-
kernel/sys_ni.c | 1 +
19 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl~mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall
+++ a/arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -501,3 +501,4 @@
569 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
570 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
571 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+572 common mseal sys_mseal
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h~mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall
+++ a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h
@@ -929,6 +929,8 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_lsm_get_self_attr, sys_ls
__SYSCALL(__NR_lsm_set_self_attr, sys_lsm_set_self_attr)
#define __NR_lsm_list_modules 461
__SYSCALL(__NR_lsm_list_modules, sys_lsm_list_modules)
+#define __NR_mseal 462
+__SYSCALL(__NR_mseal, sys_mseal)
/*
* Please add new compat syscalls above this comment and update
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h~mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall
+++ a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
#define __ARM_NR_compat_set_tls (__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 5)
#define __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END (__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 0x800)
-#define __NR_compat_syscalls 462
+#define __NR_compat_syscalls 463
#endif
#define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE
--- a/arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl~mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall
+++ a/arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl
@@ -475,3 +475,4 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal
--- a/arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl~mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall
+++ a/arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -461,3 +461,4 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal
--- a/arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl~mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall
+++ a/arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -467,3 +467,4 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl~mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall
+++ a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl
@@ -400,3 +400,4 @@
459 n32 lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 n32 lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 n32 lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 n32 mseal sys_mseal
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl~mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall
+++ a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl
@@ -376,3 +376,4 @@
459 n64 lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 n64 lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 n64 lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 n64 mseal sys_mseal
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl~mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall
+++ a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl
@@ -449,3 +449,4 @@
459 o32 lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 o32 lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 o32 lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 o32 mseal sys_mseal
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl~mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall
+++ a/arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -460,3 +460,4 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl~mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall
+++ a/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -548,3 +548,4 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl~mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall
+++ a/arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -464,3 +464,4 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal sys_mseal
--- a/arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl~mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall
+++ a/arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -464,3 +464,4 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl~mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall
+++ a/arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -507,3 +507,4 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl~mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall
+++ a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
@@ -466,3 +466,4 @@
459 i386 lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 i386 lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 i386 lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 i386 mseal sys_mseal
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl~mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall
+++ a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
@@ -383,6 +383,7 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal
#
# Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
--- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl~mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall
+++ a/arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -432,3 +432,4 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h~mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall
+++ a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
@@ -842,8 +842,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_lsm_set_self_attr, sys_ls
#define __NR_lsm_list_modules 461
__SYSCALL(__NR_lsm_list_modules, sys_lsm_list_modules)
+#define __NR_mseal 462
+__SYSCALL(__NR_mseal, sys_mseal)
+
#undef __NR_syscalls
-#define __NR_syscalls 462
+#define __NR_syscalls 463
/*
* 32 bit systems traditionally used different
--- a/kernel/sys_ni.c~mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall
+++ a/kernel/sys_ni.c
@@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ COND_SYSCALL(migrate_pages);
COND_SYSCALL(move_pages);
COND_SYSCALL(set_mempolicy_home_node);
COND_SYSCALL(cachestat);
+COND_SYSCALL(mseal);
COND_SYSCALL(perf_event_open);
COND_SYSCALL(accept4);
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx are
mseal-add-mseal-syscall.patch
selftest-mm-mseal-memory-sealing.patch
mseal-add-documentation.patch
selftest-mm-mseal-read-only-elf-memory-segment.patch
