[merged mm-hotfixes-stable] procfs-prevent-unpriveleged-processes-accessing-fdinfo-dir.patch removed from -mm tree

[Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

The quilt patch titled
     Subject: procfs: prevent unprivileged processes accessing fdinfo dir
has been removed from the -mm tree.  Its filename was
     procfs-prevent-unpriveleged-processes-accessing-fdinfo-dir.patch

This patch was dropped because it was merged into mm-hotfixes-stable

------------------------------------------------------
From: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: procfs: prevent unprivileged processes accessing fdinfo dir

The file permissions on the fdinfo dir from were changed from
S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR to S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, and a PTRACE_MODE_READ check was added
for opening the fdinfo files [1].  However, the ptrace permission check
was not added to the directory, allowing anyone to get the open FD numbers
by reading the fdinfo directory.

Add the missing ptrace permission check for opening the fdinfo directory.

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210308170651.919148-1-kaleshsingh@xxxxxxxxxx

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210713162008.1056986-1-kaleshsingh@xxxxxxxxxx
Fixes: 7bc3fa0172a4 ("procfs: allow reading fdinfo with PTRACE_MODE_READ")
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Hridya Valsaraju <hridya@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---

 fs/proc/fd.c |   23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/proc/fd.c~procfs-prevent-unpriveleged-processes-accessing-fdinfo-dir
+++ a/fs/proc/fd.c
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ out:
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int seq_fdinfo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+static int proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	bool allowed = false;
 	struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
@@ -86,6 +86,16 @@ static int seq_fdinfo_open(struct inode
 	if (!allowed)
 		return -EACCES;
 
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int seq_fdinfo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	int ret = proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(inode);
+
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	return single_open(file, seq_show, inode);
 }
 
@@ -348,12 +358,23 @@ static int proc_readfdinfo(struct file *
 				  proc_fdinfo_instantiate);
 }
 
+static int proc_open_fdinfo(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	int ret = proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(inode);
+
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 const struct inode_operations proc_fdinfo_inode_operations = {
 	.lookup		= proc_lookupfdinfo,
 	.setattr	= proc_setattr,
 };
 
 const struct file_operations proc_fdinfo_operations = {
+	.open		= proc_open_fdinfo,
 	.read		= generic_read_dir,
 	.iterate_shared	= proc_readfdinfo,
 	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
_

Patches currently in -mm which might be from kaleshsingh@xxxxxxxxxx are