From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@xxxxxxxxxx> Subject: kasan, page_alloc: deduplicate should_skip_kasan_poison Patch series "kasan, vmalloc, arm64: add vmalloc tagging support for SW/HW_TAGS", v6. This patchset adds vmalloc tagging support for SW_TAGS and HW_TAGS KASAN modes. About half of patches are cleanups I went for along the way. None of them seem to be important enough to go through stable, so I decided not to split them out into separate patches/series. The patchset is partially based on an early version of the HW_TAGS patchset by Vincenzo that had vmalloc support. Thus, I added a Co-developed-by tag into a few patches. SW_TAGS vmalloc tagging support is straightforward. It reuses all of the generic KASAN machinery, but uses shadow memory to store tags instead of magic values. Naturally, vmalloc tagging requires adding a few kasan_reset_tag() annotations to the vmalloc code. HW_TAGS vmalloc tagging support stands out. HW_TAGS KASAN is based on Arm MTE, which can only assigns tags to physical memory. As a result, HW_TAGS KASAN only tags vmalloc() allocations, which are backed by page_alloc memory. It ignores vmap() and others. This patch (of 39): Currently, should_skip_kasan_poison() has two definitions: one for when CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT is enabled, one for when it's not. Instead of duplicating the checks, add a deferred_pages_enabled() helper and use it in a single should_skip_kasan_poison() definition. Also move should_skip_kasan_poison() closer to its caller and clarify all conditions in the comment. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@xxxxxxxxxx Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/658b79f5fb305edaf7dc16bc52ea870d3220d4a8.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@xxxxxxxxxx Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@xxxxxxx> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx> Cc: Will Deacon <will@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- mm/page_alloc.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) --- a/mm/page_alloc.c~kasan-page_alloc-deduplicate-should_skip_kasan_poison +++ a/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -378,25 +378,9 @@ int page_group_by_mobility_disabled __re */ static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(deferred_pages); -/* - * Calling kasan_poison_pages() only after deferred memory initialization - * has completed. Poisoning pages during deferred memory init will greatly - * lengthen the process and cause problem in large memory systems as the - * deferred pages initialization is done with interrupt disabled. - * - * Assuming that there will be no reference to those newly initialized - * pages before they are ever allocated, this should have no effect on - * KASAN memory tracking as the poison will be properly inserted at page - * allocation time. The only corner case is when pages are allocated by - * on-demand allocation and then freed again before the deferred pages - * initialization is done, but this is not likely to happen. - */ -static inline bool should_skip_kasan_poison(struct page *page, fpi_t fpi_flags) +static inline bool deferred_pages_enabled(void) { - return static_branch_unlikely(&deferred_pages) || - (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && - (fpi_flags & FPI_SKIP_KASAN_POISON)) || - PageSkipKASanPoison(page); + return static_branch_unlikely(&deferred_pages); } /* Returns true if the struct page for the pfn is uninitialised */ @@ -447,11 +431,9 @@ defer_init(int nid, unsigned long pfn, u return false; } #else -static inline bool should_skip_kasan_poison(struct page *page, fpi_t fpi_flags) +static inline bool deferred_pages_enabled(void) { - return (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && - (fpi_flags & FPI_SKIP_KASAN_POISON)) || - PageSkipKASanPoison(page); + return false; } static inline bool early_page_uninitialised(unsigned long pfn) @@ -1267,6 +1249,35 @@ out: return ret; } +/* + * Skip KASAN memory poisoning when either: + * + * 1. Deferred memory initialization has not yet completed, + * see the explanation below. + * 2. Skipping poisoning is requested via FPI_SKIP_KASAN_POISON, + * see the comment next to it. + * 3. Skipping poisoning is requested via __GFP_SKIP_KASAN_POISON, + * see the comment next to it. + * + * Poisoning pages during deferred memory init will greatly lengthen the + * process and cause problem in large memory systems as the deferred pages + * initialization is done with interrupt disabled. + * + * Assuming that there will be no reference to those newly initialized + * pages before they are ever allocated, this should have no effect on + * KASAN memory tracking as the poison will be properly inserted at page + * allocation time. The only corner case is when pages are allocated by + * on-demand allocation and then freed again before the deferred pages + * initialization is done, but this is not likely to happen. + */ +static inline bool should_skip_kasan_poison(struct page *page, fpi_t fpi_flags) +{ + return deferred_pages_enabled() || + (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && + (fpi_flags & FPI_SKIP_KASAN_POISON)) || + PageSkipKASanPoison(page); +} + static void kernel_init_free_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, bool zero_tags) { int i; _
