The patch titled
Subject: mm/slub: actually fix freelist pointer vs redzoning
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
mm-slub-actually-fix-freelist-pointer-vs-redzoning.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
------------------------------------------------------
From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: mm/slub: actually fix freelist pointer vs redzoning
It turns out that SLUB redzoning ("slub_debug=Z") checks from
s->object_size rather than from s->inuse (which is normally bumped to make
room for the freelist pointer), so a cache created with an object size
less than 24 would have the freelist pointer written beyond
s->object_size, causing the redzone to be corrupted by the freelist
pointer. This was very visible with "slub_debug=ZF":
BUG test (Tainted: G B ): Right Redzone overwritten
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: 0xffff957ead1c05de-0xffff957ead1c05df @offset=1502. First byte 0x1a instead of 0xbb
INFO: Slab 0xffffef3950b47000 objects=170 used=170 fp=0x0000000000000000 flags=0x8000000000000200
INFO: Object 0xffff957ead1c05d8 @offset=1496 fp=0xffff957ead1c0620
Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........
Object (____ptrval____): 00 00 00 00 00 f6 f4 a5 ........
Redzone (____ptrval____): 40 1d e8 1a aa @....
Padding (____ptrval____): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
Adjust the offset to stay within s->object_size.
(Note that no caches of in this size range are known to exist in the
kernel currently.)
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608183955.280836-4-keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200807160627.GA1420741@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0f7dd7b2-7496-5e2d-9488-2ec9f8e90441@xxxxxxx/Fixes: 89b83f282d8b (slub: avoid redzone when choosing freepointer location)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CANpmjNOwZ5VpKQn+SYWovTkFB4VsT-RPwyENBmaK0dLcpqStkA@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: Marco Elver <elver@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: "Lin, Zhenpeng" <zplin@xxxxxxx>
Tested-by: Marco Elver <elver@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@xxxxxx>
Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
mm/slub.c | 14 +++-----------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/slub.c~mm-slub-actually-fix-freelist-pointer-vs-redzoning
+++ a/mm/slub.c
@@ -3689,7 +3689,6 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_c
{
slab_flags_t flags = s->flags;
unsigned int size = s->object_size;
- unsigned int freepointer_area;
unsigned int order;
/*
@@ -3698,13 +3697,6 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_c
* the possible location of the free pointer.
*/
size = ALIGN(size, sizeof(void *));
- /*
- * This is the area of the object where a freepointer can be
- * safely written. If redzoning adds more to the inuse size, we
- * can't use that portion for writing the freepointer, so
- * s->offset must be limited within this for the general case.
- */
- freepointer_area = size;
#ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG
/*
@@ -3730,7 +3722,7 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_c
/*
* With that we have determined the number of bytes in actual use
- * by the object. This is the potential offset to the free pointer.
+ * by the object and redzoning.
*/
s->inuse = size;
@@ -3753,13 +3745,13 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_c
*/
s->offset = size;
size += sizeof(void *);
- } else if (freepointer_area > sizeof(void *)) {
+ } else {
/*
* Store freelist pointer near middle of object to keep
* it away from the edges of the object to avoid small
* sized over/underflows from neighboring allocations.
*/
- s->offset = ALIGN(freepointer_area / 2, sizeof(void *));
+ s->offset = ALIGN_DOWN(s->object_size / 2, sizeof(void *));
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx are
