[folded-merged] kasan-detect-negative-size-in-memory-operation-function-fix.patch removed from -mm tree

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The patch titled
     Subject: kasan/tags: fix -Wdeclaration-after-statement warn
has been removed from the -mm tree.  Its filename was
     kasan-detect-negative-size-in-memory-operation-function-fix.patch

This patch was dropped because it was folded into kasan-detect-negative-size-in-memory-operation-function.patch

------------------------------------------------------
From: Qian Cai <cai@xxxxxx>
Subject: kasan/tags: fix -Wdeclaration-after-statement warn

The linux-next commit "kasan: detect negative size in memory operation
function" introduced a compilation warning,

mm/kasan/tags_report.c:51:27: warning: ISO C90 forbids mixing
declarations and code [-Wdeclaration-after-statement]
        struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;

Fix it by moving a code around a bit where there is no strict
dependency.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1583509030-27939-1-git-send-email-cai@xxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@xxxxxx>
Cc: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---

 mm/kasan/tags_report.c |   22 +++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c~kasan-detect-negative-size-in-memory-operation-function-fix
+++ a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
@@ -36,17 +36,6 @@
 
 const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
 {
-	/*
-	 * If access_size is a negative number, then it has reason to be
-	 * defined as out-of-bounds bug type.
-	 *
-	 * Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as
-	 * a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
-	 * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
-	 */
-	if (info->access_addr + info->access_size < info->access_addr)
-		return "out-of-bounds";
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY
 	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
 	struct kmem_cache *cache;
@@ -71,6 +60,17 @@ const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_ac
 	}
 
 #endif
+	/*
+	 * If access_size is a negative number, then it has reason to be
+	 * defined as out-of-bounds bug type.
+	 *
+	 * Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as
+	 * a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
+	 * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
+	 */
+	if (info->access_addr + info->access_size < info->access_addr)
+		return "out-of-bounds";
+
 	return "invalid-access";
 }
 
_

Patches currently in -mm which might be from cai@xxxxxx are

mm-disable-kcsan-for-kmemleak.patch
mm-swapfile-fix-data-races-in-try_to_unuse.patch
kasan-detect-negative-size-in-memory-operation-function.patch
mm-vmscan-fix-data-races-at-kswapd_classzone_idx.patch




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