The patch titled
Subject: kernel/sysctl.c: fix out-of-bounds access when setting file-max
has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is
kernel-sysctlc-fix-out-of-bounds-access-when-setting-file-max.patch
This patch should soon appear at
http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/kernel-sysctlc-fix-out-of-bounds-access-when-setting-file-max.patch
and later at
http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/kernel-sysctlc-fix-out-of-bounds-access-when-setting-file-max.patch
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From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
Subject: kernel/sysctl.c: fix out-of-bounds access when setting file-max
32a5ad9c2285 ("sysctl: handle overflow for file-max") hooked up min/max
values for the file-max sysctl parameter via the .extra1 and .extra2
fields in the corresponding struct ctl_table entry.
Unfortunately, the minimum value points at the global 'zero' variable,
which is an int. This results in a KASAN splat when accessed as a long by
proc_doulongvec_minmax on 64-bit architectures:
| BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax+0x5d8/0x6a0
| Read of size 8 at addr ffff2000133d1c20 by task systemd/1
|
| CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 5.1.0-rc3-00012-g40b114779944 #2
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| Call trace:
| dump_backtrace+0x0/0x228
| show_stack+0x14/0x20
| dump_stack+0xe8/0x124
| print_address_description+0x60/0x258
| kasan_report+0x140/0x1a0
| __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x18/0x20
| __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax+0x5d8/0x6a0
| proc_doulongvec_minmax+0x4c/0x78
| proc_sys_call_handler.isra.19+0x144/0x1d8
| proc_sys_write+0x34/0x58
| __vfs_write+0x54/0xe8
| vfs_write+0x124/0x3c0
| ksys_write+0xbc/0x168
| __arm64_sys_write+0x68/0x98
| el0_svc_common+0x100/0x258
| el0_svc_handler+0x48/0xc0
| el0_svc+0x8/0xc
|
| The buggy address belongs to the variable:
| zero+0x0/0x40
|
| Memory state around the buggy address:
| ffff2000133d1b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa
| ffff2000133d1b80: fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa
| >ffff2000133d1c00: fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00
| ^
| ffff2000133d1c80: fa fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00
| ffff2000133d1d00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Fix the splat by introducing a unsigned long 'zero_ul' and using that
instead.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190403153409.17307-1-will.deacon@xxxxxxx
Fixes: 32a5ad9c2285 ("sysctl: handle overflow for file-max")
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Matteo Croce <mcroce@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
kernel/sysctl.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c~kernel-sysctlc-fix-out-of-bounds-access-when-setting-file-max
+++ a/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ static int zero;
static int __maybe_unused one = 1;
static int __maybe_unused two = 2;
static int __maybe_unused four = 4;
+static unsigned long zero_ul;
static unsigned long one_ul = 1;
static unsigned long long_max = LONG_MAX;
static int one_hundred = 100;
@@ -1750,7 +1751,7 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
.maxlen = sizeof(files_stat.max_files),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
- .extra1 = &zero,
+ .extra1 = &zero_ul,
.extra2 = &long_max,
},
{
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from will.deacon@xxxxxxx are
kernel-sysctlc-fix-out-of-bounds-access-when-setting-file-max.patch
