The patch titled
Subject: userfaultfd: shmem: allocate anonymous memory for MAP_PRIVATE shmem
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
userfaultfd-shmem-allocate-anonymous-memory-for-map_private-shmem.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
------------------------------------------------------
From: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@xxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: userfaultfd: shmem: allocate anonymous memory for MAP_PRIVATE shmem
Userfaultfd did not create private memory when UFFDIO_COPY was invoked on
a MAP_PRIVATE shmem mapping. Instead it wrote to the shmem file, even
when that had not been opened for writing. Though, fortunately, that
could only happen where there was a hole in the file.
Fix the shmem-backed implementation of UFFDIO_COPY to create private
memory for MAP_PRIVATE mappings. The hugetlbfs-backed implementation was
already correct.
This change is visible to userland, if userfaultfd has been used in
unintended ways: so it introduces a small risk of incompatibility, but is
necessary in order to respect file permissions.
An app that uses UFFDIO_COPY for anything like postcopy live migration
won't notice the difference, and in fact it'll run faster because there
will be no copy-on-write and memory waste in the tmpfs pagecache anymore.
Userfaults on MAP_PRIVATE shmem keep triggering only on file holes like
before.
The real zeropage can also be built on a MAP_PRIVATE shmem mapping through
UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE and that's safe because the zeropage pte is never dirty,
in turn even an mprotect upgrading the vma permission from PROT_READ to
PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE won't make the zeropage pte writable.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126173452.26955-3-aarcange@xxxxxxxxxx
Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
mm/userfaultfd.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/userfaultfd.c~userfaultfd-shmem-allocate-anonymous-memory-for-map_private-shmem
+++ a/mm/userfaultfd.c
@@ -380,7 +380,17 @@ static __always_inline ssize_t mfill_ato
{
ssize_t err;
- if (vma_is_anonymous(dst_vma)) {
+ /*
+ * The normal page fault path for a shmem will invoke the
+ * fault, fill the hole in the file and COW it right away. The
+ * result generates plain anonymous memory. So when we are
+ * asked to fill an hole in a MAP_PRIVATE shmem mapping, we'll
+ * generate anonymous memory directly without actually filling
+ * the hole. For the MAP_PRIVATE case the robustness check
+ * only happens in the pagetable (to verify it's still none)
+ * and not in the radix tree.
+ */
+ if (!(dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) {
if (!zeropage)
err = mcopy_atomic_pte(dst_mm, dst_pmd, dst_vma,
dst_addr, src_addr, page);
@@ -489,7 +499,8 @@ retry:
* dst_vma.
*/
err = -ENOMEM;
- if (vma_is_anonymous(dst_vma) && unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(dst_vma)))
+ if (!(dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) &&
+ unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(dst_vma)))
goto out_unlock;
while (src_addr < src_start + len) {
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from aarcange@xxxxxxxxxx are
