The patch titled
Subject: procfs: use an enum for possible hidepid values
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
procfs-use-an-enum-for-possible-hidepid-values.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
------------------------------------------------------
From: Lafcadio Wluiki <wluikil@xxxxxxxxx>
Subject: procfs: use an enum for possible hidepid values
Previously, the hidepid parameter was checked by comparing literal
integers 0, 1, 2. Let's add a proper enum for this, to make the checking
more expressive:
0 â?? HIDEPID_OFF
1 â?? HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS
2 â?? HIDEPID_INVISIBLE
This changes the internal labelling only, the userspace-facing interface
remains unmodified, and still works with literal integers 0, 1, 2.
No functional changes.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1484572984-13388-2-git-send-email-djalal@xxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Lafcadio Wluiki <wluikil@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@xxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 8 ++++----
fs/proc/inode.c | 2 +-
fs/proc/root.c | 3 ++-
include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 6 ++++++
4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff -puN fs/proc/base.c~procfs-use-an-enum-for-possible-hidepid-values fs/proc/base.c
--- a/fs/proc/base.c~procfs-use-an-enum-for-possible-hidepid-values
+++ a/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -697,11 +697,11 @@ static int proc_pid_permission(struct in
task = get_proc_task(inode);
if (!task)
return -ESRCH;
- has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, 1);
+ has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS);
put_task_struct(task);
if (!has_perms) {
- if (pid->hide_pid == 2) {
+ if (pid->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) {
/*
* Let's make getdents(), stat(), and open()
* consistent with each other. If a process
@@ -1737,7 +1737,7 @@ int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, st
stat->gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
if (task) {
- if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, 2)) {
+ if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
/*
* This doesn't prevent learning whether PID exists,
@@ -3168,7 +3168,7 @@ int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *file,
int len;
cond_resched();
- if (!has_pid_permissions(ns, iter.task, 2))
+ if (!has_pid_permissions(ns, iter.task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE))
continue;
len = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%d", iter.tgid);
diff -puN fs/proc/inode.c~procfs-use-an-enum-for-possible-hidepid-values fs/proc/inode.c
--- a/fs/proc/inode.c~procfs-use-an-enum-for-possible-hidepid-values
+++ a/fs/proc/inode.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static int proc_show_options(struct seq_
if (!gid_eq(pid->pid_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID))
seq_printf(seq, ",gid=%u", from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, pid->pid_gid));
- if (pid->hide_pid != 0)
+ if (pid->hide_pid != HIDEPID_OFF)
seq_printf(seq, ",hidepid=%u", pid->hide_pid);
return 0;
diff -puN fs/proc/root.c~procfs-use-an-enum-for-possible-hidepid-values fs/proc/root.c
--- a/fs/proc/root.c~procfs-use-an-enum-for-possible-hidepid-values
+++ a/fs/proc/root.c
@@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ int proc_parse_options(char *options, st
case Opt_hidepid:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
- if (option < 0 || option > 2) {
+ if (option < HIDEPID_OFF ||
+ option > HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) {
pr_err("proc: hidepid value must be between 0 and 2.\n");
return 0;
}
diff -puN include/linux/pid_namespace.h~procfs-use-an-enum-for-possible-hidepid-values include/linux/pid_namespace.h
--- a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h~procfs-use-an-enum-for-possible-hidepid-values
+++ a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h
@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ struct pidmap {
struct fs_pin;
+enum { /* definitions for pid_namespace's hide_pid field */
+ HIDEPID_OFF = 0,
+ HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS = 1,
+ HIDEPID_INVISIBLE = 2,
+};
+
struct pid_namespace {
struct kref kref;
struct pidmap pidmap[PIDMAP_ENTRIES];
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from wluikil@xxxxxxxxx are
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