[patch 090/123] proc: report no_new_privs state

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From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: proc: report no_new_privs state

Similar to being able to examine if a process has been correctly confined
with seccomp, the state of no_new_privs is equally interesting, so this
adds it to /proc/$pid/status.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161103214041.GA58566@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jann@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Rodrigo Freire <rfreire@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Robert Ho <robert.hu@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: "Richard W.M. Jones" <rjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---

 Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt |    2 ++
 fs/proc/array.c                    |    5 +++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff -puN Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt~proc-report-no_new_privs-state Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt~proc-report-no_new_privs-state
+++ a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ read the file /proc/PID/status:
   CapPrm: 0000000000000000
   CapEff: 0000000000000000
   CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
+  NoNewPrivs:     0
   Seccomp:        0
   voluntary_ctxt_switches:        0
   nonvoluntary_ctxt_switches:     1
@@ -262,6 +263,7 @@ Table 1-2: Contents of the status files
  CapPrm                      bitmap of permitted capabilities
  CapEff                      bitmap of effective capabilities
  CapBnd                      bitmap of capabilities bounding set
+ NoNewPrivs                  no_new_privs, like prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIV, ...)
  Seccomp                     seccomp mode, like prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, ...)
  Cpus_allowed                mask of CPUs on which this process may run
  Cpus_allowed_list           Same as previous, but in "list format"
diff -puN fs/proc/array.c~proc-report-no_new_privs-state fs/proc/array.c
--- a/fs/proc/array.c~proc-report-no_new_privs-state
+++ a/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -342,10 +342,11 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_f
 
 static inline void task_seccomp(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
 {
+	seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "NoNewPrivs:\t", task_no_new_privs(p));
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
-	seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "Seccomp:\t", p->seccomp.mode);
-	seq_putc(m, '\n');
+	seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "\nSeccomp:\t", p->seccomp.mode);
 #endif
+	seq_putc(m, '\n');
 }
 
 static inline void task_context_switch_counts(struct seq_file *m,
_
--
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