The patch titled
Subject: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
proc-prevent-accessing-proc-pid-environ-until-its-ready.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
------------------------------------------------------
From: Mathias Krause <minipli@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get inconsistent
data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff -puN fs/proc/base.c~proc-prevent-accessing-proc-pid-environ-until-its-ready fs/proc/base.c
--- a/fs/proc/base.c~proc-prevent-accessing-proc-pid-environ-until-its-ready
+++ a/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -955,7 +955,8 @@ static ssize_t environ_read(struct file
struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data;
unsigned long env_start, env_end;
- if (!mm)
+ /* Ensure the process spawned far enough to have an environment. */
+ if (!mm || !mm->env_end)
return 0;
page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY);
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from minipli@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx are
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