The patch titled
Fix security check for joint context= and fscontext= mount options
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename is
fix-security-check-for-joint-context=-and-fscontext=-mount.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Fix security check for joint context= and fscontext= mount options
From: Eric Paris <eparis@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
After some discussion on the actual meaning of the filesystem class
security check in try context mount it was determined that the checks for
the context= mount options were not correct if fscontext mount option had
already been used.
When labeling the superblock we should be checking relabel_from and
relabel_to. But if the superblock has already been labeled (with
fscontext) then context= is actually labeling the inodes, and so we should
be checking relabel_from and associate. This patch fixes which checks are
called depending on the mount options.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxx>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 14 +++++++++-----
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff -puN security/selinux/hooks.c~fix-security-check-for-joint-context=-and-fscontext=-mount security/selinux/hooks.c
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c~fix-security-check-for-joint-context=-and-fscontext=-mount
+++ a/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -523,12 +523,16 @@ static int try_context_mount(struct supe
goto out_free;
}
- rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
- if (rc)
- goto out_free;
-
- if (!fscontext)
+ if (!fscontext) {
+ rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_free;
sbsec->sid = sid;
+ } else {
+ rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_free;
+ }
sbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from eparis@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx are
-
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