On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 1:56 PM, James Hogan <james.hogan@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Add a PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL ptrace operation to allow the system call to be
> cancelled independently to the value of the v0 system call number
> register.
>
> This is needed for SECCOMP_RET_TRACE when the tracer wants to cancel the
> system call, since it has to set both the system call number to -1 and
> the chosen return value, both of which reside in the same register (v0).
> The tracer should set the return value first, followed by
> PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL to set the system call number to -1.
>
> That is in contrast to the normal ptrace syscall hook which triggers the
> tracer on both entry and exit, allowing the system call to be cancelled
> during the entry hook (setting system call number register to -1, or
> optionally using PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL), separately to setting the return
> value during the exit hook.
>
> Positive values (to change the syscall that should be executed instead
> of cancelling it entirely) are explicitly disallowed at the moment. The
> same thing can be done safely already by writing the v0 system call
> number register and the argument registers, and allowing
> thread_info::syscall to be changed to a different value independently of
> the v0 register would potentially allow seccomp or the syscall trace
> events to be fooled into thinking a different system call was being
> executed.
Wouldn't the sycall be reloaded, so no spoofing could occur?
Regardless, can you update
tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c to update or eliminate
the MIPS-only SYSCALL_NUM_RET_SHARE_REG special-case? (Or maybe it
needs to be further special-cased to split syscall-changing from
syscall-cancelling?)
-Kees
>
> Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: linux-mips@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> ---
> arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 1 +
> arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 11 +++++++++++
> arch/mips/kernel/ptrace32.c | 11 +++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h b/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h
> index 91a3d197ede3..23af103c4e8d 100644
> --- a/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h
> +++ b/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h
> @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ struct pt_regs {
>
> #define PTRACE_GET_THREAD_AREA 25
> #define PTRACE_SET_THREAD_AREA 26
> +#define PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL 27
>
> /* Calls to trace a 64bit program from a 32bit program. */
> #define PTRACE_PEEKTEXT_3264 0xc0
> diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
> index 465fc5633e61..9bf31a990c6e 100644
> --- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
> +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
> @@ -853,6 +853,17 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
> ret = put_user(task_thread_info(child)->tp_value, datalp);
> break;
>
> + case PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL:
> + /*
> + * This is currently only useful to cancel the syscall from a
> + * seccomp RET_TRACE tracer.
> + */
> + if ((long)data >= 0)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + task_thread_info(child)->syscall = -1;
> + ret = 0;
> + break;
> +
> case PTRACE_GET_WATCH_REGS:
> ret = ptrace_get_watch_regs(child, addrp);
> break;
> diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace32.c b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace32.c
> index 2b9260f92ccd..cca76aec9c10 100644
> --- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace32.c
> +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace32.c
> @@ -287,6 +287,17 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
> (unsigned int __user *) (unsigned long) data);
> break;
>
> + case PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL:
> + /*
> + * This is currently only useful to cancel the syscall from a
> + * seccomp RET_TRACE tracer.
> + */
> + if ((long)data >= 0)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + task_thread_info(child)->syscall = -1;
> + ret = 0;
> + break;
> +
> case PTRACE_GET_THREAD_AREA_3264:
> ret = put_user(task_thread_info(child)->tp_value,
> (unsigned long __user *) (unsigned long) data);
> --
> 2.13.2
>
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
