On Thu, Jun 9, 2016 at 3:52 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Thu, Jun 9, 2016 at 2:01 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> This moves seccomp after ptrace on x86 to that seccomp can catch changes >> made by ptrace. Emulation should skip the rest of processing too. >> >> We can get rid of test_thread_flag because there's no longer any >> opportunity for seccomp to mess with ptrace state before invoking >> ptrace. >> >> Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> >> Cc: x86@xxxxxxxxxx >> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> >> --- >> arch/x86/entry/common.c | 22 ++++++++++++---------- >> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c >> index df56ca394877..81c0e12d831c 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c >> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c >> @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ static long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) >> >> struct thread_info *ti = pt_regs_to_thread_info(regs); >> unsigned long ret = 0; >> + bool emulated = false; >> u32 work; >> >> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY)) >> @@ -80,11 +81,19 @@ static long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) >> >> work = ACCESS_ONCE(ti->flags) & _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY; >> >> + if (unlikely(work & _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)) >> + emulated = true; >> + >> + if ((emulated || (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) && >> + tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) >> + return -1L; >> + >> + if (emulated) >> + return -1L; >> + > > I think that this code will result in ptrace-induced skips calling the > audit exit hook but not the audit entry hook. I don't know whether > this is a problem. It's also worth making sure that ptracing a > seccomp-skipped syscall calls the exit hook with the right regs. > > I suspect it's fine, but I want to think about it a little bit more. I don't think this is true, since all architectures already needed to handle an immediate return from seccomp, so audit shouldn't be touched on the exit path either. -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security