3.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Paul Burton <paul.burton@xxxxxxxxxx> commit b1442d39fac2fcfbe6a4814979020e993ca59c9e upstream. If one or more matching FCSR cause & enable bits are set in saved thread context then when that context is restored the kernel will take an FP exception. This is of course undesirable and considered an oops, leading to the kernel writing a backtrace to the console and potentially rebooting depending upon the configuration. Thus the kernel avoids this situation by clearing the cause bits of the FCSR register when handling FP exceptions and after emulating FP instructions. However the kernel does not prevent userland from setting arbitrary FCSR cause & enable bits via ptrace, using either the PTRACE_POKEUSR or PTRACE_SETFPREGS requests. This means userland can trivially cause the kernel to oops on any system with an FPU. Prevent this from happening by clearing the cause bits when writing to the saved FCSR context via ptrace. This problem appears to exist at least back to the beginning of the git era in the PTRACE_POKEUSR case. Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: linux-mips@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/7438/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ int ptrace_setfpregs(struct task_struct } __get_user(child->thread.fpu.fcr31, data + 64); + child->thread.fpu.fcr31 &= ~FPU_CSR_ALL_X; /* FIR may not be written. */ @@ -696,7 +697,7 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *chi break; #endif case FPC_CSR: - child->thread.fpu.fcr31 = data; + child->thread.fpu.fcr31 = data & ~FPU_CSR_ALL_X; break; case DSP_BASE ... DSP_BASE + 5: { dspreg_t *dregs;
