From: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@xxxxxxxxxx> Currently, xfs_scrub_all has to run with enough privileges to find mounted XFS filesystems and the device associated with that mount and to start xfs_scrub@<mountpoint> sub-services. Minimize the risk of xfs_scrub_all escaping its service container or contaminating the rest of the system by using systemd's sandboxing controls to prohibit as much access as possible. The directives added by this patch were recommended by the command 'systemd-analyze security xfs_scrub_all.service' in systemd 249. Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@xxxxxxxxxx> --- scrub/xfs_scrub_all.service.in | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+) diff --git a/scrub/xfs_scrub_all.service.in b/scrub/xfs_scrub_all.service.in index 96be90e74ee6..478cd8d057a2 100644 --- a/scrub/xfs_scrub_all.service.in +++ b/scrub/xfs_scrub_all.service.in @@ -18,3 +18,65 @@ SyslogIdentifier=xfs_scrub_all # Create the service underneath the scrub background service slice so that we # can control resource usage. Slice=system-xfs_scrub.slice + +# Run scrub_all with minimal CPU and IO priority so that nothing will starve. +IOSchedulingClass=idle +CPUSchedulingPolicy=idle +CPUAccounting=true +Nice=19 + +# No realtime scheduling +RestrictRealtime=true + +# No special privileges, but we still have to run as root so that we can +# contact the service manager to start the sub-units. +CapabilityBoundingSet= +NoNewPrivileges=true +RestrictSUIDSGID=true + +# Make the entire filesystem readonly. We don't want to hide anything because +# we need to find all mounted XFS filesystems in the host. +ProtectSystem=strict +ProtectHome=read-only +PrivateTmp=false + +# No network access except to the systemd control socket +PrivateNetwork=true +ProtectHostname=true +RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX +IPAddressDeny=any + +# Don't let the program mess with the kernel configuration at all +ProtectKernelLogs=true +ProtectKernelModules=true +ProtectKernelTunables=true +ProtectControlGroups=true +ProtectProc=invisible +RestrictNamespaces=true + +# Hide everything in /proc, even /proc/mounts +ProcSubset=pid + +# Only allow the default personality Linux +LockPersonality=true + +# No writable memory pages +MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true + +# Don't let our mounts leak out to the host +PrivateMounts=true + +# Restrict system calls to the native arch and only enough to get things going +SystemCallArchitectures=native +SystemCallFilter=@system-service +SystemCallFilter=~@privileged +SystemCallFilter=~@resources +SystemCallFilter=~@mount + +# Media scan stamp file shouldn't be readable by regular users +UMask=0077 + +# lsblk ignores mountpoints if it can't find the device files, so we cannot +# hide them +#ProtectClock=true +#PrivateDevices=true
