From: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@xxxxxxxxxx>
The unending stream of syzbot bug reports and overwrought filing of CVEs
for corner case handling (i.e. things that distract from actual user
complaints) in XFS has generated all sorts of of overheated rhetoric
about how every bug is a Serious Security Issue(tm) because anyone can
craft a malicious filesystem on a USB stick, insert the stick into a
victim machine, and mount will trigger a bug in the kernel driver that
leads to some compromise or DoS or something.
I thought that nobody would be foolish enough to automount an XFS
filesystem. What a fool I was! It turns out that udisks can be told
that it's okay to automount things, and then it will. Including mangled
XFS filesystems!
<delete angry rant about poor decisionmaking and armchair fs developers
blasting us on X while not actually doing any of the work>
Turn off /this/ idiocy by adding a udev rule to tell udisks not to
automount XFS filesystems.
This will not stop a logged in user from unwittingly inserting a
malicious storage device and pressing [mount] and getting breached.
This is not a substitute for a thorough audit. This does not solve the
general problem of in-kernel fs drivers being a huge attack surface.
I just want a vacation from the shitstorm of bad ideas and threat
models that I never agreed to support.
[Does this actually stop udisks? I turned off all automounting at the
DE level years ago because I'm not that stupid.]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
configure.ac | 1 +
include/builddefs.in | 2 ++
m4/package_services.m4 | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
scrub/64-xfs.rules | 10 ++++++++++
scrub/Makefile | 9 +++++++++
5 files changed, 64 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 scrub/64-xfs.rules
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 58f3b8e2e90..e447121a344 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ AC_HAVE_SG_IO
AC_HAVE_HDIO_GETGEO
AC_CONFIG_SYSTEMD_SYSTEM_UNIT_DIR
AC_CONFIG_CROND_DIR
+AC_CONFIG_UDEV_RULE_DIR
if test "$enable_blkid" = yes; then
AC_HAVE_BLKID_TOPO
diff --git a/include/builddefs.in b/include/builddefs.in
index fb8e239cab2..3318e00316c 100644
--- a/include/builddefs.in
+++ b/include/builddefs.in
@@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ HAVE_SYSTEMD = @have_systemd@
SYSTEMD_SYSTEM_UNIT_DIR = @systemd_system_unit_dir@
HAVE_CROND = @have_crond@
CROND_DIR = @crond_dir@
+HAVE_UDEV = @have_udev@
+UDEV_RULE_DIR = @udev_rule_dir@
HAVE_LIBURCU_ATOMIC64 = @have_liburcu_atomic64@
HAVE_MEMFD_CLOEXEC = @have_memfd_cloexec@
HAVE_MEMFD_NOEXEC_SEAL = @have_memfd_noexec_seal@
diff --git a/m4/package_services.m4 b/m4/package_services.m4
index f2d888a099a..a683ddb93e0 100644
--- a/m4/package_services.m4
+++ b/m4/package_services.m4
@@ -75,3 +75,45 @@ AC_DEFUN([AC_CONFIG_CROND_DIR],
AC_SUBST(have_crond)
AC_SUBST(crond_dir)
])
+
+#
+# Figure out where to put udev rule files
+#
+AC_DEFUN([AC_CONFIG_UDEV_RULE_DIR],
+[
+ AC_REQUIRE([PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG])
+ AC_ARG_WITH([udev_rule_dir],
+ [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-udev-rule-dir@<:@=DIR@:>@],
+ [Install udev rules into DIR.])],
+ [],
+ [with_udev_rule_dir=yes])
+ AS_IF([test "x${with_udev_rule_dir}" != "xno"],
+ [
+ AS_IF([test "x${with_udev_rule_dir}" = "xyes"],
+ [
+ PKG_CHECK_MODULES([udev], [udev],
+ [
+ with_udev_rule_dir="$($PKG_CONFIG --variable=udev_dir udev)/rules.d"
+ ], [
+ with_udev_rule_dir=""
+ ])
+ m4_pattern_allow([^PKG_(MAJOR|MINOR|BUILD|REVISION)$])
+ ])
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for udev rule dir])
+ udev_rule_dir="${with_udev_rule_dir}"
+ AS_IF([test -n "${udev_rule_dir}"],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(${udev_rule_dir})
+ have_udev="yes"
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ have_udev="no"
+ ])
+ ],
+ [
+ have_udev="disabled"
+ ])
+ AC_SUBST(have_udev)
+ AC_SUBST(udev_rule_dir)
+])
diff --git a/scrub/64-xfs.rules b/scrub/64-xfs.rules
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..39f17850097
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scrub/64-xfs.rules
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2023 Oracle. All rights reserved.
+#
+# Author: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@xxxxxxxxxx>
+#
+# Don't let udisks automount XFS filesystems without even asking a user.
+# This doesn't eliminate filesystems as an attack surface; it only prevents
+# evil maid attacks when all sessions are locked.
+SUBSYSTEM=="block", ENV{ID_FS_TYPE}=="xfs", ENV{UDISKS_AUTO}="0"
diff --git a/scrub/Makefile b/scrub/Makefile
index ab9c2d14832..74193ed270b 100644
--- a/scrub/Makefile
+++ b/scrub/Makefile
@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ endif
endif # scrub_prereqs
+UDEV_RULES = 64-xfs.rules
+ifeq ($(HAVE_UDEV),yes)
+ INSTALL_SCRUB += install-udev
+endif
+
HFILES = \
common.h \
counter.h \
@@ -180,6 +185,10 @@ install-scrub: default
$(INSTALL) -m 755 $(XFS_SCRUB_ALL_PROG) $(PKG_SBIN_DIR)
$(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(PKG_STATE_DIR)
+install-udev: $(UDEV_RULES)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(UDEV_RULE_DIR)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 $(UDEV_RULES) $(UDEV_RULE_DIR)
+
install-dev:
-include .dep
