https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216073 --- Comment #19 from yuzhao@xxxxxxxxxx --- On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 1:52 PM Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 12:43:45PM -0600, Yu Zhao wrote: > > On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 12:05 PM Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > wrote: > > > > > > On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 11:59:58AM -0600, Yu Zhao wrote: > > > > Please let me know if there is something we want to test -- I can > > > > reproduce the problem reliably: > > > > > > > > ------------[ cut here ]------------ > > > > kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! > > > > > > The line right before cut here would have been nice ;-) > > > > Right. > > > > $ grep usercopy: > > usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset > > 2882303761517129920, size 11)! > > usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset > > 8574853690513436864, size 11)! > > usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset > > 7998392938210013376, size 11)! > > That's a different problem. And, er, what? How on earth do we have > an offset that big?! > > struct vm_struct *area = find_vm_area(ptr); > offset = ptr - area->addr; > if (offset + n > get_vm_area_size(area)) > usercopy_abort("vmalloc", NULL, to_user, offset, n); > > That first offset is 0x2800'0000'0000'30C0 > > You said it was easy to replicate; can you add: > > printk("addr:%px ptr:%px\n", area->addr, ptr); > > so that we can start to understand how we end up with such a bogus > offset? Here you go: addr:96ffffdfebcd4000 ptr:ffffffdfebcd70c0 usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset 7566047373982445760, size 11)! And, not sure if it'd be helpful, with the vmap: va_start:ffffffd83db0d000 va_end:ffffffd83db13000 addr:44ffffd83db0d000 ptr:ffffffd83db100c0 usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset 13474770085092536512, size 11)! which seems to explain why the fix worked. + if (offset + n > get_vm_area_size(area)) { + struct vmap_area *vmap = find_vmap_area((unsigned long)ptr); + + if (vmap) + printk("va_start:%px va_end:%px\n", vmap->va_start, vmap->va_end); + printk("addr:%px ptr:%px\n", area->addr, ptr); usercopy_abort("vmalloc", NULL, to_user, offset, n); + } -- You may reply to this email to add a comment. You are receiving this mail because: You are watching someone on the CC list of the bug.