On 6/14/18 5:16 PM, Marco Benatto wrote:
> Currently when root inode is in short-form and its parent ino
> has an invalid value, process_sf_dir2() ends up not fixing it,
> because if verify_inum() fails we never get to the next case which
> would fix the root inode's parent pointer.
>
> This behavior triggers the following assert on process_dir2():
>
> ASSERT((ino != mp->m_sb.sb_rootino && ino != *parent) ||
> (ino == mp->m_sb.sb_rootino &&
> (ino == *parent || need_root_dotdot == 1)));
>
> This patch fixes this behavior by making sure we always properly
> handle rootino parent pointer in process_sf_dir2()
>
> Signed-off-by: Marco Benatto <mbenatto@xxxxxxxxxx>
This looks correct to me, thanks.
FWIW the problem can be demonstrated by setting the root inode's
parent to 0 on a freshly made fs:
# mkfs.xfs -f -dfile,name=fsfile,size=1g
# xfs_db -x -c "sb 0" -c "addr rootino" -c "write u3.sfdir3.hdr.parent.i4 0" fsfile
# xfs_repair fsfile
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> repair/dir2.c | 4 +++-
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/repair/dir2.c b/repair/dir2.c
> index e162d2b..225f926 100644
> --- a/repair/dir2.c
> +++ b/repair/dir2.c
> @@ -495,8 +495,10 @@ _("corrected entry offsets in directory %" PRIu64 "\n"),
>
> /*
> * if parent entry is bogus, null it out. we'll fix it later .
> + * If the validation fails for the root inode we fix it in
> + * the next else case.
> */
> - if (verify_inum(mp, *parent)) {
> + if (verify_inum(mp, *parent) && ino != mp->m_sb.sb_rootino) {
>
> do_warn(
> _("bogus .. inode number (%" PRIu64 ") in directory inode %" PRIu64 ", "),
>
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