Hi, The following patches fix a couple of issues with the permission check we do in vfs_dedupe_file_range(). The first patch expands our check to allow dedupe of a file if the user owns it or otherwise would be allowed to write to it. Current behavior is that we'll allow dedupe only if: - the user is an admin (root) - the user has the file open for write This makes it impossible for a user to dedupe their own file set unless they do it as root, or ensure that all files have write permission. There's a couple of duperemove bugs open for this: https://github.com/markfasheh/duperemove/issues/129 https://github.com/markfasheh/duperemove/issues/86 The other problem we have is also related to forcing the user to open target files for write - A process trying to exec a file currently being deduped gets ETXTBUSY. The answer (as above) is to allow them to open the targets ro - root can already do this. There was a patch from Adam Borowski to fix this back in 2016: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/7/17/130 which I have incorporated into my changes. The 2nd patch fixes our return code for permission denied to be EPERM. For some reason we're returning EINVAL - I think that's probably my fault. At any rate, we need to be returning something descriptive of the actual problem, otherwise callers see EINVAL and can't really make a valid determination of what's gone wrong. This has also popped up in duperemove, mostly in the form of cryptic error messages. Because this is a code returned to userspace, I did check the other users of extent-same that I could find. Both 'bees' and 'rust-btrfs' do the same as duperemove and simply report the error (as they should). The patches are also available in git: git pull https://github.com/markfasheh/linux dedupe-perms Thanks, --Mark Changes from V1 to V2: - Add inode_permission check as suggested by Adam Borowski - V1 discussion: https://marc.info/?l=linux-xfs&m=152606684017965&w=2 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-xfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html