On Wed, 2010-07-07 at 15:07 -0400, John W. Linville wrote:
> The current mac80211 code assumes that WEP is always available. If WEP
> fails to initialize, ieee80211_register_hw will always fail.
>
> In some cases (e.g. FIPS certification), the cryptography used by WEP is
> unavailable. However, in such cases there is no good reason why CCMP
> encryption (or even no link level encryption) cannot be used. So, this
> patch removes mac80211's assumption that WEP (and TKIP) will always be
> available for use.
>
> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> v3 -> actually post changed patch...
> v2 -> make it safe to call ieee80211_wep_free even if ieee80211_wep_init
> had failed
I think this is missing a change like this:
--- a/net/mac80211/cfg.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/cfg.c
@@ -1228,6 +1228,10 @@ static int ieee80211_scan(struct wiphy *wiphy,
static int ieee80211_auth(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *dev,
struct cfg80211_auth_request *req)
{
+ if (req->auth_type == NL80211_AUTHTYPE_SHARED_KEY &&
+ IS_ERR(sdata->local->wep_tx_tfm))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
return ieee80211_mgd_auth(IEEE80211_DEV_TO_SUB_IF(dev), req);
}
since otherwise you could end up trying to encrypt the auth frame with
the uninitialised WEP TFM?
johannes
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