Dear Ubuntu Team,
We have analyzed the issue, but due to our limited time and ability to
create a fix, we are unable to submit a patch directly. However, we
can provide some ideas to assist you in generating a fix that we can
then test.
I have encountered a race condition issue in the RT2X00 driver,
specifically related to the function rt2x00usb_work_rxdone. The issue
manifests as a kernel NULL pointer dereference, which causes the
system to crash. Below is the detailed analysis and my suggestions for
addressing the issue.
Problem Analysis
The kernel panic log indicates that the crash occurs due to a NULL
pointer dereference at the following location:
[ 371.258315] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000038
[ 371.258339] CPU: 8 PID: 144 Comm: kworker/u40:2 Not tainted
6.8.0-40-generic #40~22.04.2-Ubuntu
[ 371.258346] Workqueue: phy23 rt2x00usb_work_rxdone [rt2x00usb]
The root cause appears to be a race condition where multiple threads
may simultaneously access and modify shared resources without proper
synchronization. Specifically, it seems that the pointer being
accessed in rt2x00usb_work_rxdone is not consistently initialized
before being used, leading to the NULL pointer dereference.
Suggestions for Fix
Introduce Locking Mechanisms: To prevent concurrent access to shared
resources, I recommend introducing locking mechanisms such as spinlock
or mutex. This would ensure that only one thread can access the
critical section at a time, thereby avoiding race conditions.
Pointer Validity Check: Before dereferencing any pointer, it's
essential to check whether the pointer is valid (i.e., not NULL). If
the pointer is invalid, the function should safely return without
proceeding further.
Retry and Delay Mechanism: If a critical resource is not yet
initialized or is in an unexpected state, implementing a retry
mechanism with delays could help avoid crashes. Additionally, more
debug information should be logged in case of failure to assist in
diagnosing the issue.
Code Review: A comprehensive code review focusing on areas where
hardware resources and multithreading operations intersect could
reveal other potential race conditions. Identifying and addressing
these issues proactively would enhance the driver’s robustness.
Example Code Snippet
While I cannot provide a complete patch, here is an example of how the
suggested changes could be implemented:
void rt2x00usb_work_rxdone(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct rt2x00_dev *rt2x00dev = container_of(work, struct
rt2x00_dev, rxdone_work);
unsigned long flags;
void *data;
// Lock to protect shared resources
spin_lock_irqsave(&rt2x00dev->irq_lock, flags);
data = rt2x00usb_get_rx_data(rt2x00dev);
if (!data) {
// Unlock and return if data is not valid
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rt2x00dev->irq_lock, flags);
return;
}
// Process the data
...
// Unlock after processing
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rt2x00dev->irq_lock, flags);
}
This snippet shows how to introduce a spinlock to protect shared
resources and ensure that the pointer is valid before dereferencing
it.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the race condition in the RT2X00 driver is likely
caused by insufficient synchronization between threads. By adding
proper locking mechanisms, pointer validity checks, and retry
mechanisms, this issue can be mitigated. I hope these suggestions will
assist in resolving the problem. If you require further assistance or
additional information
Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> 于2024年8月20日周二 01:43写道：
>
> On Mon, Aug 19, 2024 at 11:11:10PM +0800, color Ice wrote:
> > On some TP-Link routers or routers running OpenWrt, as well as Raspberry Pi
> > devices with a headless setup and BeagleBone boards, certain USB
> > configurations are required by default. These devices typically grant
> > higher permissions to USB by default. Therefore, on certain devices, I can
> > run a PoC without using sudo. This explains why there are some inherent
> > risk scenarios when declaring this vulnerability, as there are many Linux
> > distributions applied to different embedded devices.
>
> I suggest filing bugs with those distros/system images so that they
> properly remove the ability for users to reset any random USB device
> this way. If any user can disconnect any driver from any device, that's
> not a good system...
>
> Also, why not dig into the code and try to come up with a fix while
> waiting? The code is all there for everyone to read and resolve, that
> way you get the proper credit for fixing the issue as well.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
