On Fri, 1 Dec 2023 10:17:02 -0800 Kees Cook wrote:
> > > -static inline int nla_len(const struct nlattr *nla)
> > > +static inline u16 nla_len(const struct nlattr *nla)
> > > {
> > > - return nla->nla_len - NLA_HDRLEN;
> > > + return nla->nla_len > NLA_HDRLEN ? nla->nla_len - NLA_HDRLEN : 0;
> > > }
> >
> > Note the the NLA_HDRLEN is the length of struct nlattr.
> > I mean of the @nla object that gets passed in as argument here.
> > So accepting that nla->nla_len may be < NLA_HDRLEN means
> > that we are okay with dereferencing a truncated object...
> >
> > We can consider making the return unsinged without the condition maybe?
>
> Yes, if we did it without the check, it'd do "less" damage on
> wrap-around. (i.e. off by U16_MAX instead off by INT_MAX).
>
> But I'd like to understand: what's the harm in adding the clamp? The
> changes to the assembly are tiny:
> https://godbolt.org/z/Ecvbzn1a1
Hm, I wonder if my explanation was unclear or you disagree..
This is the structure:
struct nlattr {
__u16 nla_len; // attr len, incl. this header
__u16 nla_type;
};
and (removing no-op wrappers):
#define NLA_HDRLEN sizeof(struct nlattr)
So going back to the code:
return nla->nla_len > NLA_HDRLEN ? nla->nla_len - NLA_HDRLEN...
We are reading nla->nla_len, which is the first 2 bytes of the structure.
And then we check if the structure is... there?
If we don't trust that struct nlattr which gets passed here is at least
NLA_HDRLEN (4B) then why do we think it's safe to read nla_len (the
first 2B of it)?
That's why I was pointing at nla_ok(). nla_ok() takes the size of the
buffer / message as an arg, so that it can also check if looking at
nla_len itself is not going to be an OOB access. 99% of netlink buffers
we parse come from user space. So it's not like someone could have
mis-initialized the nla_len in the kernel and being graceful is helpful.
The extra conditional is just a minor thing. The major thing is that
unless I'm missing something the check makes me go 🤨️
